"[T]he existence of even a severe psychiatric defect is not always apparent to laymen." Bruce v. Estelle, 536 F.2d 1051, 1059 (5th Cir. 1976).

"[T]he testimony of trial counsel [in a post-conviction challenge to his effectiveness] cannot be treated as coming from a totally disinterested witness." Bolius v. Wainwright, 597 F.2d 986, 989 (5th Cir. 1979).

"One need not be catatonic, raving or frothing, to be [legally incompetent]." Lokos v. Capps, 625 F.2d 1258, 1267 (5th Cir. 1980).

"In any event, the prosecutor should have no influence in the selection [of a psychiatrist assisting an indigent defendant]." United States v. Bass, 477 F.2d 723, 726 (9th Cir. 1973).

"[T]he simple fact that counsel made some effort does not defeat an ineffective claim." Walker v. Mitchell, 587 F.Supp. 1432 (E.D.Va. 1984).

When "a psychiatrist designated by the trial court to conduct a neutral competency examination" goes beyond simply reporting on competence and testifies at the penalty phase, he becomes like "an agent of the State recounting unwarned statements made in a post-arrest custodial setting," and use of his testimony could violate the Fifth Amendment.Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 467 (1981).

"An attorney who does seriously interview an arguably insane client may find him to be one of those many insane persons who placidly insist that they are entirely sane; as the attorney is likely to find that an arguably insane client is not the best or most reliable source of information." Davis v. Alabama, 596 F.2d 1214, 1220 (5th Cir. 1979).