2005 Unpublished Court of Appeals Opinions Index |
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Caldwell v Com,2004-CA-000989
--Not Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Cahill III v Com.,2004-CA-001192
-- Not Published ; Affirming in Part, Reversing in Part and Remanding
-- PDF
Carpenter v Com, 2003-CA-001005
-- Not To Be Published ; Affirming -- PDF
Carr v Com, 2004-CA-001319 -- Not Published ;Affirming -- PDF
Carver v Com, 2003-CA-001774 -- Not To Be
Published; Affirming -- PDF
Caldwell v Com, 2003-CA-000356
-- Not Published ; Affirming -- PDF
Carpenter v Com, 2003-CA-001879
-- Not Published ; Affirming -- PDF
Caudill v Com, 2004-CA-001729
-- Not Published ; Affirming in part, Reversing in part and Remanding -- PDF
Cavins Jr., v Com, 2004-CA-000028 -- Not To Be
Published;Affirming -- PDF
Cecil v Com., 2004-CA-001433
--Not Published ;Affirming
-- PDF
Chapa v Com., 2004-CA-001889
-- Not To Be Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Chapman v Com, 2004-CA-000882
-- Not Published ; Affirming -- PDF
Chappell v Com, 2003-CA-002344 -- Not To Be
Published; Reversing -- PDF
Chenault v Com, 2004-CA-000463--Not To Be
Published; Affirming -- PDF
Childress v Com, 2004-CA-001594
-- Not Published ; Affirming -
-- PDF
Childs v Com, 2004-CA-000488 -- Not To Be
Published; Affirming -- PDF
Clark v Com, 2003-CA-001954--Not To Be Published;
Affirming -- PDF
Clark v Com, 2004-CA-001848
-- Not Published ; Affirming -
-- PDF
Clark v Com., 2004-CA-001256
-- Not Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Cleaver v Com., 2004-CA-001459
-- Not Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Clem v Com, 2004-CA-002114
-- Not Published ; Affirming -
-- PDF
Clemente v Com., 2004-CA-001903
--Not To Be Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Cleveland v Com, 2004-CA-000978
--Not To be Published ; Affirming -- PDF
Cleveland v Com, 2004-CA-000978
-- Published ; Affirming -
-- PDF
Cline v Com, 2003-CA-002259--Not To Be
Published; Affirming -- PDF
Cochran v Com,2004-CA-000799
-- Not Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Coffman v Com.,2004-CA-002140
-- Not To Be Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Coker v Com, 2004-CA-000398
--Not To Be Published ; Reversing and Remanding
-- PDF
Coker v Com,2004-CA-000398
-- Not Published ; Reversing and Remanding
-- PDF
Cole v Com., 2004-CA-002228
-- Not Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Coleman v Com, 2003-CA-001399 -- Not To Be
Published; Affirming -- PDF
Coleman v Com, 2005-CA-000300
-- Not Published ; Affirming -
-- PDF
Collins v Com., 2004-CA-001424
-- Not to be Published ; Affirming -- PDF
Collins v Com, 2003-CA-002127
--Not To Be Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Com v Brown, 2003-CA-002624
-- Not Published ; Reversing -
-- PDF
Com. v Evans, 2004-CA-001914
-- Not Published ; Reversing and Remanding -- PDF
Com. v Honorable Armstrong and Smaljovic., 2004-CA-000646 -- Not To Be
Published; Affirming -- PDF
Com v Gevorgiyan, 2003-CA-002743
-- Not Published ; Affirming -- PDF
Com v Goff, 2004-CA-000794
-- Not to be Published ; Reversing and Remanding -- PDF
Com v Greenwood, 2004-CA-001767
-- Not Published ; Affirming -- PDF
Com v Harlow, 2004-CA-000996
-- Not to be Published ; Affirming -- PDF
Com v Holderman, 2004-CA-002525
-- Not Published ; Affirming -
-- PDF
Com. v Moore, 2004-CA-000891 -- Not To Be
Published; Reversing & Remanding -- PDF
Com V Rainey, 2002-CA-002070--Not To Be
Published; Reversing and Remanding -- PDF
Com. v Young,2004-CA-002370
-- To Be Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Conn v Com, 2003-CA-002096--Not To Be
Published; Affirming -- PDF
Conway v Com., 2004-CA-001689
--Not To Be Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Cooper v Com, 2004-CA-001402
-- Not Published ; Affirming -- PDF
Cooper III v Com, 2004-CA-001737
--Not To Be Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Cox v Com, 2004-CA-000481--Not To Be
Published; Affirming -- PDF
Crawford v Com., 2004-CA-001304
-- Not Published ;Affirming
-- PDF
Creech v Com, 2004-CA-000910
-- Not Published ; Affirming -
-- PDF
Crooks v Com., 2004-CA-001710
--Not To Be Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Cross v Com, 2004-CA-001149
-- Not to be Published ; Affirming -- PDF
Crum v Com, 2004-CA-000180 -- Not To Be
Published; Affirming -- PDF
Crum v Com., 2004-CA-002384
-- To Be Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Cundiff v Com, 2003-CA-002338
-- Not Published ; Affirming -- PDF
Curry v Com, 2004-CA-001208
-- Not Published ; Affirming -- PDF
Curry V Com., 2004-CA-001164 -- Not Published ; Affirming -- PDF
In March 1999 Gary Caldwell was indicted for manufacturing methamphetamine, a Class B felony. On June 7 of that year, Caldwell entered a plea of guilty to trafficking in methamphetamine, a Class C felony. He was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. Caldwell received shock probation the following December for testifying as a witness for the Commonwealth against several others.
Robert Cahill, III, appeals from a judgment of the Fulton Circuit Court, entered May 13, 2004, convicting him of tampering with anhydrous ammonia with intent to manufacture methamphetamine by complicity;1 and third-degree criminal trespass by complicity.2 He was sentenced to sixteen years in prison and a $250.00 fine, respectively. He contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a directed verdict with respect to his alleged intent to promote the manufacture of methamphetamine, by misinstructing the jury, and by failing to separate one of the Commonwealth’s witnesses. Because we agree that the jury instructions were fatally flawed, we reverse in part and remand.
Jeffery L. Carpenter has appealed from the
final judgment entered by the Butler Circuit Court on April 17,
2003, following a jury verdict of guilty on one count of sexual
abuse in the first degree,1 and guilty of persistent felony
offender in the first degree (PFO I).2 Carpenter was sentenced
to 15 years’ imprisonment pursuant to the jury’s recommendation.
Having concluded that (1) Carpenter’s motion for disposition of
pending charges was not filed in accordance with KRS 500.110 and
that he waived his speedy trial motion, and (2) the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike Juror No. 35
for cause, we affirm.
Anthony Carr was found guilty of
receiving stolen property valued over $300 and pleaded guilty to
persistent felony offender in the second degree. On appeal, the
sole issue raised is whether the circuit court erred when it
denied Carr’s motion to suppress evidence allegedly obtained as
a result of an illegal search and seizure. We hold that the circuit court’s finding that Carr consented to the search is
supported by substantial evidence and affirm.
Randall Carver appeals from an order of the
Warren Circuit Court denying his pro se CR 60.02 motion. Carver
was convicted following a jury trial in 1989 of receiving stolen
property and of being a persistent felony offender (PFO). As
found by the court below, the instant CR 60.02 motion was the
second one filed by Carver.
A circuit court jury convicted Daniel Lynn
Caldwell of assaulting Michael Gambrel by shooting him in the
head with a handgun at close range. And the court sentenced
Caldwell to a maximum of seven years in prison. On direct
appeal from that judgment, Caldwell asserts two trial errors that call for reversal. Specifically, he argues that the trial
court erred by allowing into evidence a single photograph that
Gambrell described as showing a spot where one of the bullets
Caldwell fired at him struck an exterior wall of Gambrell’s
house. He also argues that the trial court erred by failing to
direct a verdict of acquittal on its own motion. We find no
merit in either of Caldwell’s arguments. So we affirm the
judgment.
Mitchell Carpenter appeals from an order of the
Laurel Circuit Court denying his request for relief pursuant to
Kentucky Civil Rule (CR) 60.02. Carpenter argues that the trial
court erroneously sentenced him to a term exceeding the limits
imposed by statute and also violated the prohibitions against
double jeopardy and multiple punishments contained in the United
States and Kentucky Constitutions.
Jason Wayne Caudill (Caudill) brings this
appeal from an Order of the Fayette Circuit Court, entered
August 4, 2004, summarily denying his "Motion for Relief," made
pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42,
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in the entry of a
guilty plea to ten felony offenses and five misdemeanor offenses, resulting in a sentence of twenty-five years'
imprisonment and $21,025.00 in restitution. Before us, Caudill
argues that the circuit court erred in not holding an
evidentiary hearing to address his claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Having reviewed the record, we conclude
that Caudill is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the sole
issue of effective assistance of counsel pertaining to
restitution; therefore we affirm in part, reverse in part, and
remand.
John Louis Cavins, Jr. appeals from a jury
verdict and judgment finding him guilty of second degree
manslaughter and complicity to robbery first degree and
sentencing him to fifteen (15) years imprisonment. Upon review,
we affirm.
James Cecil appeals pro se from the Hardin Circuit Court’s order denying his motion for RCr 11.42 relief subsequent to an evidentiary hearing. For the following reasons, we affirm.
In this collateral attack under RCr 11.42, Gregory Chapa (Gregory) appeals the trial court’s denial of his pro se motion to correct his sentence. In January of 1999, Gregory entered a guilty plea to third degree burglary and being a persistent felony offender in the second degree. The trial court sentenced him to five years on the burglary charge, enhanced to seven years by the persistent felony offendercharge. See this Court’s unpublished opinion in Chapa v. Commonwealth, 2000-CA-002931-MR (2002), which recited Gregory’s actual sentence. Gregory argues that his sentence is contrary to KRS 532.080. In addition to the argument pertaining to sentencing, Gregory argues -- for the first time in this appeal -- that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance.
This is an appeal from the final judgment
and sentence of the Jefferson Circuit Court. A jury found the
appellant, Corey Quantez Chapman, guilty of possession of
cocaine and marijuana as a subsequent offender and sentenced him
to imprisonment of seven and one-half years. On appeal, Chapman
contends that the trial court committed two errors: (1) in
failing to dismiss a juror from the venire and (2) in permitting
the Commonwealth to introduce evidence tending to show that he
-2-
had committed other uncharged crimes. As we find no reversible
error, we affirm the convictions.
Ken Chappell appeals his conviction in the
Pulaski Circuit Court for one count of theft by failure to make
required disposition of property, KRS 514.070. Chappell argues
on appeal that the facts proved by the Commonwealth did not
establish that offense. He relies on Commonwealth v. Jeter, 590
S.W.2d 346 (Ky.App. 1979), which held that KRS 514.070 does not
criminalize a transaction in which a seller accepts money for
the purchase of merchandise and then refuses to deliver the
property. Chappell’s motion to dismiss the indictment prior to
-2-
trial on that basis was denied. Chappell moved for a directed
verdict of acquittal at the close of the Commonwealth’s
evidence, and at the close of all the evidence. Those motions
were denied. After the jury found Chappell guilty, he was
sentenced by the court to one year in prison.
Monica Lee Chenault
appeals from an order of the Fayette Circuit Court reflecting her conditional
plea of guilty to one count each of first-degree possession of a controlled
substance, third-degree possession of a controlled substance, and possession
of drug paraphernalia, second or subsequent offense. Prior to pleading guilty,
Chenault unsuccessfully moved to suppress the introduction of evidence
discovered during a police search of her residence. She now appeals the order
denying the motion to suppress. For the -2- reasons stated below, we affirm
both the order denying the motion to suppress and the judgment reflecting the
guilty plea.
Damon Childress appeals from the judgment of the Hart Circuit Court entered on a conditional guilty plea to charges of possession of drug paraphernalia (second offense), fleeing or evading police in the second degree, prescription in an improper container, operating a motor vehicle on a suspended license, and improper equipment. A charge of persistent felony offender in the first degree was dismissed by agreement.
Appellant, Kevin Childs (Childs), brings
this appeal from a February 12, 2004, order of the Kenton
Circuit Court overruling his motion to set aside his guilty plea. Before us, Childs argues that the trial court erred in
not allowing withdrawal of the guilty plea. We affirm.
Appellant, Daniel Clark (Clark), takes a direct
appeal from the Bullitt Circuit Court judgment convicting him of
two counts of first degree sexual abuse. We affirm the
conviction.
This is an appeal from an order denying
appellant’s RCr 11.42 motion alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel for failing to fully advise appellant regarding a plea
agreement offered by the Commonwealth. Upon review of the
hearing on the motion, we agree with the trial court that
appellant’s counsel did not render ineffective assistance of
counsel. Hence, we affirm.
Eric Ellsworth Clark, pro se, has appealed from the May 27, 2004, order of the Jefferson Circuit Court which denied his pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or correct the trial court’s final judgment and sentence of imprisonment pursuant to RCr1 11.42, without holding an evidentiary hearing. Having concluded that the trial court did not err in denying Clark’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel without holding an evidentiary hearing, we affirm.
Alphonso Cleaver appeals pro se from the Hardin Circuit Court’s order denying his motion for relief pursuant to RCr 11.42. For the following reasons, we affirm.
In the early morning hours of July 4, 2003, Officer Jerad Curtsinger of the Lexington Police Department was on patrol when he noticed that the automobile in front of him had veered twice towards the centerline. Cecil Carl Clem was the driver of that automobile. Officer Curtsinger followed Clem’s vehicle for approximately a mile, but, before he could stop the automobile, Clem halted along Dayton Avenue and got out.
On April 20, 2004, the appellant, Lucio Luna Clemente, entered a plea of guilty to the crime of assault in the first degree. He appeals from the final judgment and twelve-year sentence of imprisonment imposed by the Daviess Circuit Court on August 27, 2004. He also appeals from the court’s order of August 19, 2004, which denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
Appellant, Bryan Cleveland (Cleveland), appeals
his conviction of flagrant non-Support, claiming that the
Commonwealth of Kentucky lacked jurisdiction to hear his case.
This appeal is based on a question of law, therefore, our review
will be De Novo. Because we agree with the trial court that the
Commonwealth of Kentucky does have jurisdiction, we affirm.
Appellant, Bryan Cleveland (Cleveland), appeals his conviction of flagrant nonsupport, claiming that the Commonwealth of Kentucky lacked jurisdiction to hear his case. This appeal is based on a question of law; therefore, our review will be De Novo. Because we agree with the trial court that the Commonwealth of Kentucky does have jurisdiction, we affirm.
Appellant, Phillip Cline (Cline), appeals his
Floyd Circuit Court conviction of reckless homicide. Cline
contends that a separate federal conviction barred the state
charge. The circuit court found that the state charge was
separate and distinct. We affirm the trial court’s ruling.
Ewell Cochran brings this pro se appeal from a January 28, 2004, order of the Rowan Circuit Court denying his Ky. R. Crim. P. (RCr) 11.42 motion to vacate his fifty-year sentence of imprisonment. We affirm.
David Coffman appeals from the judgment of the Casey Circuit Court convicting him of second-degree assault and tampering with physical evidence. Coffman argues that the trial court erred in denying his motions for directed verdict due to insufficiency of the evidence to prove intentional conduct on his part or serious injury to the victim. We disagree and affirm the trial court.
For the past thirty years, Martin Twist, an entrepreneur, has owned and operated numerous businesses specializing in drilling for natural gas. Since Twist’s businesses have historically been capital intensive, he has been required over the years to solicit large sums of money from numerous individuals. According to Twist, he has always kept investor information confidential. Twist has employed agents to call and solicit money from potential investors. Two of Twist’s solicitors were Ronnie Lee Coker and Forrest Hammond. In early 2003, Twist fired both employees.
For the past thirty years, Martin Twist, an entrepreneur, has owned and operated numerous businesses specializing in drilling for natural gas. Since Twist’s businesses have historically been capital intensive, he has been required over the years to solicit large sums of money from numerous individuals. According to Twist, he has always kept investor information confidential. Twist has employed agents to call and solicit money from potential investors. Two of Twist’s solicitors were Ronnie Lee Coker and Forrest Hammond. In early 2003, Twist fired both employees.
Julius Cole appeals from an order of the McCracken Circuit Court, entered September 29, 2004, revoking his conditional discharge from prison and ordering him to serve the remaining three years of his sentence. Cole contends that the statute creating the three-year extension of his sentence is an unconstitutional usurpation by the General Assembly of a
judicial function and that the extension amounts to a cruel and unusual punishment. Because Cole’s attack upon the statute was not preserved and because his four-year total sentence for first-degree sexual abuse is not grossly disproportionate, we affirm.
Brent Marcel Coleman Jr., brings Appeal No.
2003-CA-001399-MR from a July 1, 2003, judgment of the Fayette
Circuit Court on a jury verdict convicting him of manslaughter
in the first degree and other related crimes. Antonio Taylor
brings Appeal No. 2003-CA-001458-MR from a June 24, 2003,
judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court on a jury verdict
convicting him of complicity to commit manslaughter in the
second degree and other related crimes. We affirm.
Following his plea of guilty to various felonies and the status offense of being a first-degree persistent felon, Tim Joe Coleman filed a RCr 11.42 motion to vacate his 60-year sentence on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. He alleged that his attorney had informed him, and he had been persuaded by the fact, that his maximum sentence would be 20 years. The motion was denied, and this court affirmed; discretionary review was denied by the Kentucky Supreme Court.
This is an appeal from a judgment entered by
the McCracken Circuit Court after a jury convicted appellant
David Wayne Collins of possession of anhydrous ammonia in an
unapproved container with intent to manufacture methamphetamine,
and first-degree possession of a controlled substance,
methamphetamine. For the reasons stated hereafter, we affirm.
Andre Collins appeals, pro se, from an order of the Jefferson Circuit Court denying his motion for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. He argues that his attorney provided ineffective assistance, both at trial and in advising him to plead guilty and accept an agreed upon sentence after the jury convicted him. His guilty plea waives any issues regarding counsel’s performance except insofar as it related to his decision to plead guilty. Thus, the only issues for our consideration are counsel’s performance in advising Collins to plead guilty, the trial court’s decision to appoint counsel only for Collins’ appeal, and the refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing. We find that the trial court acted properly within the bounds of its discretion in denying all of Collins’ requests, and we affirm the trial court’s order denying post-conviction relief.
The Commonwealth appeals from
a November 25, 2003 order of the Fayette Circuit Court sustaining Karen Brown’s RCr1
11.42 motion for post-conviction relief. On review, we reverse.
The Commonwealth of Kentucky has taken an
interlocutory appeal pursuant to KRS 22A.020(4) from the
Jefferson Circuit Court’s August 11, 2004, order suppressing
evidence against Kevin Evans seized in a search of his vehicle
on October 8, 2003, during a traffic stop. After reviewing the
record and considering the parties’ briefs and relevant case
law, we reverse and remand.
Commonwealth of Kentucky brings this appeal from
a February 9, 2004, Opinion and Order of the Jefferson Circuit
Court that denied the Commonwealth’s petition for a writ of
prohibition against the Honorable Donald Armstrong, Jefferson
District Court Judge. Ky. R. Civ. P. 81. We affirm.
Appellant, Commonwealth of Kentucky, appeals the
Warren Circuit Court’s order sustaining a motion to amend plea
and judgment entered November 21, 2003. We affirm the trial
court’s ruling on the motion.
The Commonwealth appeals the denial in the
Washington Circuit Court of its motion requesting forfeiture
following a drug trafficking prosecution. The Commonwealth
sought forfeiture of $4,000 held by Kenneth D. Goff at the time
of his arrest for two counts of trafficking in a controlled
substance in the first degree and one count of being a
persistent felony offender in the second degree. This arrest took place two months after the alleged date of commission of
the offense, following indictment by the grand jury. On appeal, the Commonwealth argues that the trial
court held the Commonwealth to too high a burden of proof to
establish the nexus for forfeiture. In addition, the
Commonwealth asserts Goff’s proof was not credible and not
substantiated.
Appellant, the Commonwealth of Kentucky, appeals
the grant of a writ of prohibition by the Breckinridge Circuit
Court preventing a retrial in District Court of the Appellee,
Hubert Greenwood’s (Greenwood), charge of driving under the
influence on the grounds of double jeopardy. We affirm the
trial court’s ruling.
The Commonwealth appeals from a
Barren Circuit Court order and two amended final judgments
granting in part a motion by Jeffrey D. Harlow to withdraw his
plea of guilty. Harlow had entered a plea of guilty to two
charges of wanton endangerment and one charge of first-degree stalking. After final judgment and sentencing, the circuit
court allowed him to withdraw the plea of guilty to stalking on
the ground that it was involuntary, and sentenced him to serve
six years on the remaining charges. The Commonwealth contends
that there was no evidence that Harlow’s plea was involuntary,
and that in allowing him to withdraw only part of his plea, the
circuit court improperly interjected itself into the area of
plea negotiations.
The Commonwealth of Kentucky appeals from an order of the Jefferson Circuit Court dismissing the April 30, 2003, indictment against Benjamin Holderman. The indictment alleged that Holderman, a registered sex offender, violated a provision of the 2000 version of “Megan’s Law”, KRS 17.510, requiring him to notify the state police of a change of address. The indictment also alleged that Holderman was a persistent felony offender in the first degree. The Jefferson Circuit Court dismissed the indictment after agreeing with Holderman’s contention that Peterson v. Shake,2 prohibited Holderman from being charged under the 2000 version of Megan’s Law because he was already a registrant under the 1994 version of the law. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the order on appeal.
The Commonwealth of Kentucky appeals from an
order of the Russell Circuit Court dismissing an indictment for
jury tampering against Thomas Moore. The Commonwealth argues
that the trial court usurped the function of the jury in making
a factual determination that it could not prove the elements of the offense at trial. We agree; hence, the order is reversed
and this case is remanded for a jury trial.
This matter is before us on remand from the
Kentucky Supreme Court by Opinion and Order entered December 8,
2004. The Supreme Court vacated our Opinion rendered February
13, 2004, and ordered us to reconsider it in light of Thornton
v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 124 S. Ct. 2127, 158 L. Ed. 2d
905 (2004). Having considered Thornton, we issue the following
opinion.The Commonwealth of Kentucky brings this interlocutory
appeal from a September 5, 2002, order of the Jefferson Circuit
Court. Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 22A.020. We reverse and
remand.
The Commonwealth of Kentucky appeals from an order of the Anderson Circuit Court allowing certain evidence of an alleged victim’s behavior to be admitted in a rape prosecution. Barry Young, the defendant in this case, filed a motion prior to trial to introduce certain acts by the alleged victim in support of his defense that their sexual encounter was consensual. The trial court agreed to admit evidence of the prosecuting witness’ sexual fantasy about the defendant, her
multiple appearances at his place of employment prior to the incident, and her relationship with the Lawrenceburg City Police Department afterwards. The Commonwealth argues that this evidence violates Kentucky’s rape shield rule. We disagree and affirm the trial court.
While Gregory Allen Conn was in federal custody
in Ohio for manufacturing methamphetamine, his sister
volunteered to clean his apartment. She and her husband
obtained a key from Conn’s landlord, then drilled a hole in the
lock to gain access to Conn’s bedroom. Upon entering the
bedroom, the sister immediately left and contacted the state
police. After she described the contents of her brother’s
On July 14, 2003, a Fayette County grand jury returned an indictment charging Jessie Conway with two counts of trafficking in a controlled substance within one-thousand yards of a school,1 and one count each of possession of drug paraphernalia, second offense,2 alcohol intoxication,3 and being a persistent felony offender in the first degree (PFO I).4 Thereafter, Conway filed a motion to suppress statements which he made to police officers following his arrest. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion, finding that Conway’s statements were knowing and voluntary.
At approximately 6:00 a.m. on March 15,
1996, the appellant, Chris Cooper, drove his truck southbound
into the northbound lanes of Wayne Sullivan Drive in McCracken
County, Kentucky, and collided head-on with a car being driven
by Barbara Darnell, a 52-year old woman who was on her way to
work. Darnell died at the scene, and Cooper was convicted of
murder and first-degree wanton endangerment.1 He was sentenced
to 22 years in prison for the offenses, and the Kentucky Supreme
Court upheld his convictions and sentence on appeal. Cooper
later filed postconviction motions pursuant to RCr2 11.42 and CR3
60.02, but the court denied both motions. Furthermore, in
separate opinions this court affirmed the circuit court’s denial
of those motions.
On March 16, 2003, Appellant, Charles E. Cooper, III, visited the Oxmoor Mall in Louisville, Kentucky, and entered the Gymboree store. Appellant allegedly entered into a rear storage room that contained an office, took items from employees’ purses, and then left the store upon discovery by an employee. Appellant was indicted on October 13, 2003 on one count of burglary in the third degree and for being a persistent felony offender in the first degree. Appellant filed a motion to dismiss the burglary in the third degree charge on April 7, 2004. This motion was not heard by the court because Appellant accepted a plea agreement from the Commonwealth. Appellant agreed to plead guilty to persistent felony offender in the second degree and conditionally plead guilty to the charge of burglary in the third degree, pursuant to RCr 8.09. The trial court entered judgment on the guilty plea on April 20, 2004, but preserved Appellant’s right to appeal the sole issue of the burglary in the third degree charge. Subsequently, Appellant was sentenced by judgment entered July 26, 2004 to a total of six years on the charges, but was granted probation for five years. This appeal followed.
Appellant Christopher Cox (Cox), pro se,
brings this appeal from an order of the Bell Circuit Court,
entered February 13, 2004, summarily denying his motion for
post-conviction relief pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Criminal
Procedure (RCr) 11.42. Because Cox pled guilty and all of the issues he raised in his post-conviction motion could be
determined as meritless from the face of the record, we affirm.
Michele Crawford appeals from the denial of her Motion for Sentence Modification, filed pursuant to CR1 60.02. We affirm.
Carlos Creech was sentenced to ten years’
imprisonment after a jury found him guilty of second-degree
manslaughter for the shooting death of Selva Ray Thomas. Creech
now appeals the judgment of conviction and sentence claiming
that the trial court erred when it failed to suppress his confession, improperly instructed the jury on the elements of
second-degree manslaughter and reckless homicide, and that a
panel of this court erred in an interlocutory appeal when it
reversed the trial court’s grant of a new trial. We find no
merit to any of Creech’s arguments.
Jose Crooks appeals from an August 3, 2004, judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court sentencing him to a total of fifteen years’ imprisonment. We affirm.
Torrey Cross (Cross) brings this appeal
from a "Judgment of Conviction and Sentence with Jury Trial"
from the Jefferson Circuit Court, entered May 12, 2004,
adjudging him guilty of second-degree burglary,2 second-degree robbery,3 and first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO I)4
and imposing the jury recommended punishment of ten years on
each charge, to run concurrently for a term of ten years. We
affirm.
James A. Crum appeals from an order of the
Pike Circuit Court denying his motion to suppress evidence. The
issue is whether the circuit court erred in determining that the
evidence seized from Crum’s residence was admissible pursuant to
the good-faith exception to the search warrant requirement. We
conclude that the court did not err, and we thus affirm.
Kevin Paul Crum brings this appeal from an October 21, 2004, judgment of the Mercer Circuit Court upon a conditional plea of guilty to two counts of attempted murder, four counts of wanton endangerment, receiving stolen property, carrying a concealed weapon, improper registration, and third-degree criminal trespass. We affirm.
Travis Cundiff was convicted of
Trafficking in a Controlled Substance, First Degree, and
sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment. He contends that he was
entitled to an entrapment instruction and, although the issue is
not preserved for review, that the lack of the instruction
constitutes palpable error warranting reversal. We disagree and
affirm.
After the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed his
conviction for first-degree assault and for being a first-degree
persistent felony offender (“PFO I”), Erric Curry moved to
alter, amend, or vacate his sentence under RCr1 11.42. The
Jefferson Circuit Court denied his motion, ruling that Erric had not met his burden of proof. We agree with the circuit court’s
ruling and affirm.
Decorick Curry appeals from an order of the
Jefferson Circuit Court denying his RCr1 11.42 motion. We
affirm.
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