2005 Unpublished Court of Appeals Opinions Index |
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Halvorson v Com.,2004-CA-001911
-- Not To Be Published ; Reversing and Remanding
-- PDF
Hamilton v Com, 2004-CA-000790 -- Not To Be
Published; Affirming -- PDF
Hampton Com, 2003-CA-001450--Not To Be Published;
Affirming -- PDF
Hannaford v Com., 2003-CA-002751
-- Not Published ;Affirming
-- PDF
Hardin v Com, 2003-CA-002164 -- Not To Be
Published; Vacating and Remanding -- PDF
Harper v Com, 2004-CA-000751 -- Not To Be
Published; Reversing and Remanding -- PDF
Harper V Com , 2003-CA-002447 -- Not To Be
Published;Affirming -- PDF
Harper v Com, 2004-CA-001013
-- Not Published ; Affirming -- PDF
Harpring v Com,2004-CA-000898
-- Not Published ; Affirming -- PDF
Harris V Com, 2004-CA-000823--Not To Be Published;
Affirming -- PDF
Harris v Com, 2003-CA-001857
-- To Be Published ; Affirming in Part, Reversing and Remanding in Part -
-- PDF
Harrsion v Com., 2004-CA-002043
-- Not Published ;Affirming
-- PDF
Harvell v Com, 2003-CA-001527
-- Not To Be Published ; Affirming -- PDF
Hawks v Com, 2004-CA-000746 -- Not To Be
Published; Affirming -- PDF
Hayden V Com, 2004-CA-000510--Not To Be Published;
Reversing and Remanding -- PDF
Hays v Com, 2004-CA-000727 -- Not To Be
Published; Affirming -- PDF
Heard V Com, 2003-CA-002611--Not To Be Published;
Affirming -- PDF
Helm v Com, 2004-CA-000501 -- Not To Be
Published; Affirming -- PDF
Helm v Com, 2004-CA-000396
-- Not to be Published ; Affirming -- PDF
Helton v Com, 2004-CA-000253--Not To Be Published;
Affirming -- PDF
Helton v Com, 2004-CA-001232
-- Not to be Published ; Affirming -- PDF
Hembree v Com, 2003-CA-001304 -- Not To Be
Published; Affirming -- PDF
Henderson v Com, 2004-CA-000925
-- Not Published ; Affirming -- PDF
Hendrickson v Com.,2004-CA-002538
-- Not To Be Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Hendrix v Com, 2004-CA-000842
-- Not Published ; Affirming -
-- PDF
Hensley v Com, 2004-CA-001560
-- Not Published ; Affirming -- PDF
Henson v Com, 2004-CA-000849
--To be Published ; Affirming -- PDF
Hernandez v Com., 2004-CA-001579
-- Not to be Published ; Affirming -- PDF
Hicks v Com, 2004-CA-000271 -- Not To Be
Published; Affirming -- PDF
Hightower v Com, 2004-CA-002539
-- Not Published ; Affirming 2004-CA-002539-MR &
Dismissing Appeal 2004-CA-002543-MR -- PDF
Hill v Com, 2003-CA-001496--Not To Be Published;
Reversing -- PDF
Hines v Com, 2004-CA-000545
-- Not Published ; Affirming -- PDF
Hodge v Com, 2004-CA-001380
-- Not Published ; Vacating and Remanding -- PDF
Hogue v Com, 2003-CA-001144--Not To Be Published;
Affirming -- PDF
Holland v Com.,2004-CA-001986
-- Not To Be Published ; Vacating and Remanding
-- PDF
Hollins v Com., 2004-CA-000687
--Not Published ;Affirming
-- PDF
Hollingsworth v Com, 2003-CA-002563
-- Not Published ; Affirming -- PDF
Hooper v Com., 2004-CA-001554
-- Not to be Published ; Affirming -- PDF
Horn v Com, 2003-CA-002006--Not To Be Published;
Affirming -- PDF
Horton v Com, 2004-CA-002191
-- Not Published ; Affirming -
-- PDF
Hoskins v Com, 2003-CA-002787--Not To Be
Published; Affirming -- PDF
Hoskins v Com, 2003-CA-002787 -- To Be
Published; Affirming -- PDF
Humfleet v Com, 2003-CA-002340--Not To Be Published;
Affirming -- PDF Hounshell v Com, 2004-CA-002423
-- Not Published ; Affirming -
-- PDF
Houp v Com, 2004-CA-001769 -- Not Published ;Affirming -- PDF
Howard amd Adams v Com, 2004-CA-002477 -- Not To Be
Published; Opinion and Order Dismissing -- PDF
Howell v Com., 2005-CA-000389
-- Not Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Hudson v Com.,2004-CA-002570
-- Not To Be Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Hughes V Com., 2004-CA-001104 -- Not Published ; Affirming -- PDF
Hume v Com., 2004-CA-001634
-- Not To Be Published ; Reversing and Remanding
-- PDF
Hunt v Com, 2003-CA-000966--Not To Be
Published; Affirming -- PDF
Hunt v Com, 2003-CA-000966--Not To Be
Published; Affirming -- PDF
Hunt v Com, 2004-CA-001917 -- Not To Be
Published; Affirming -- PDF
Hutchinson v Com, 2003-CA-002726
--Not To Be Published ; Affirming -
-- PDF
Hutson v Com, 2002-CA-001603
-- To Be Published ; Reversing and Remanding -
-- PDF
Jason Halvorson brings this appeal from an August 12, 2004, judgment upon a jury verdict convicting him of first-degree manslaughter and sentencing him to eleven years’ imprisonment. We reverse and remand.
Sherman Lee Hamilton appeals from an order of
the Hardin Circuit Court denying his motion for RCr 11.42
relief. Pursuant to the terms of a plea agreement, Hamilton’s
indictment was amended to add an addition charge. He argued
below that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in
allowing Hamilton to plead guilty to the amended indictment.
For the reasons stated below, we affirm the order on appeal.
Daniel Reese Hampton has appealed from the
final judgment and order of imprisonment of the Pike Circuit
Court entered on July 3, 2003, which revoked his pretrial
diversion and sentenced him, pursuant to his guilty plea, to one
year in prison for the offense of flagrant nonsupport.1 Having concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
sentencing Hampton, we affirm.2
This consolidated appeal arises from the murder of Larry Keith Goins in Whitley County on May 9, 2001. Madeline Hannaford brings this Appeal No. 2003-CA-002751-MR from a December 12, 2003, order denying her Ky. R. Crim. P. (RCr) 11.42 motion to vacate her sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years. Jeffery Allen pro se brings Appeal No. 2004-CA-001017-MR from a May 10, 2004, order denying his “motion” for declaration of rights. We affirm.
Appeal No. 2003-CA-002751-MR
Hannaford was indicted upon the offenses of robbery in the first degree, and complicity to commit murder by aiding and assisting Jeffery Allen in killing Larry Keith Goins. As a result of a plea bargain, Hannaford pleaded guilty pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970), to the charges of first-degree robbery and complicity to commit murder. In exchange, Hannaford received a
1 Senior Judge Joseph R. Huddleston sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes 21.580.
Aaron Hardin appeals from an order of the
Jefferson Circuit Court, which held that he was statutorily
ineligible for shock probation because of his conviction for
wanton murder. Hardin appeals, arguing that he is eligible for
shock probation because he was convicted as a youthful offender
under KRS Chapter 640, which specifically authorizes shock
probation for youthful offenders, regardless of the offense. The Commonwealth has moved to dismiss this appeal, arguing that
even though the court's reasoning was faulty, Hardin's motion
was untimely because it should have been made when he was first
committed to the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice
after his conviction, and that even if timely it is not properly
the subject of an appeal, because the shock probation statute
prohibits an appeal from the denial of shock probation. We deny
the Commonwealth's motion, vacate the order of the circuit court
and remand the matter for a determination of the merits of
Hardin's motion for shock probation.
Walter Harper, Jr. was charged with receiving
stolen property over $300 and being a second-degree persistent
felony offender. A jury found him guilty, and he was sentenced
to a maximum of ten years’ imprisonment. The question before us
on appeal is whether a comment made by the Commonwealth at trial
regarding Harper’s alleged prior bad acts created undue
prejudice. We believe the prosecution’s statement was inappropriate, but the court’s admonition to the jury cured any
negative effect the comment may have had. So we affirm.
Inmate Clarence T. Harper appeals from an
order of the Fayette Circuit Court denying his petition for
declaratory judgment requesting that, pursuant to House Bill 269
(H.B. 269), he be awarded credit towards his remaining unexpired
sentence for time spent on parole. As Harper is not entitled to
credit under the provision at issue, we affirm.
Duane Harper, pro se, appeals from a March 26,
2004 order of the Lyon Circuit Court denying his motion for
relief pursuant to RCr2 11.42. We affirm.
Jerel Harpring appeals the trial court’s
decision to revoke his felony probation. He argues that the
revocation was unconstitutional and that the presiding judge
should have recused herself. We disagree with his contentions
and affirm the decision of the circuit court.
Raymond A. Harris entered a conditional plea of
guilty (RCr 8.09) to the charge of possession of a controlled
substance, first degree; he was sentenced to one year, enhanced
to five years upon the finding that he was a persistent felon,
second degree. He appeals from that conviction, arguing that
his motion to suppress should have been granted. We disagree,
and affirm.
In these combined appeals, Lonnie Harris argues that he should be granted a new trial following his conviction in the Casey Circuit Court. Harris was convicted of burglary in the first degree and theft by unlawful taking following a jury trial. He was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment. His conviction was affirmed by the Kentucky Supreme Court (2001-SC-0171-MR, August 22, 2002). Subsequently, Harris argued in a motion pursuant to CR 60.02, filed December 13, 2002, that he is entitled to a new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence under CR 60.02(b), and fraud (CR 60.02(d)), a void judgment (CR 60.02(e)), or other reason of extraordinary nature (CR 60.02(f)). He additionally claimed a right to relief based on newly discovered evidence pursuant to CR 60.02(b). Harris also filed a motion pursuant to RCr 11.42 claiming a right to relief because his counsel rendered ineffective assistance in the court below.
The trial court denied both the CR 60.02 and RCr 11.42 motions. We affirm the trial court’s finding that counsel’s assistance was not ineffective. However, we agree with Harris that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant a new trial under CR 60.02(f). Thus, we reverse and remand.
Gary Edward Harrison, pro se, appeals from an order of the Jefferson Circuit Court denying his motion for additional credit for jail-time served. We affirm.
Anthony G. Harvell appeals pro se
from a Jefferson Circuit Court order that denied his Kentucky
Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 60.02 motion seeking relief from a
judgment convicting him of several criminal offenses. Because
we agree with the circuit court that Harvell has not provided the grounds necessary to invoke the extraordinary relief
available under CR 60.02, we affirm the order.
Paul Hawks appeals from an order of the Kenton
Circuit Court denying his motion for post-conviction relief
under Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42. At issue
is whether an attorney who recommends a guilty plea to an
amended lesser offense which the defendant could not be found
guilty of renders ineffective assistance. The facts in the case
at hand establish that Hawks could have been convicted of a Class C felony; however, he was allowed to plead guilty to a
Class D felony. Consequently, the trial court correctly decided
that Hawks’ trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance.
Paul Hayden appeals from
an order of the Jefferson Circuit Court denying his motion for shock
probation. He contends that the Commonwealth’s objection to the motion was a
violation of a plea bargain agreement. We disagree and affirm.
Michael William Hays appeals from a judgment
of the Jefferson Circuit Court reflecting a jury verdict of
guilty on charges of fourth-degree assault – third or subsequent
offense, and second-degree persistent felony offender. For the
reasons stated below, we affirm.
This is an appeal from an order denying
appellant’s RCr 11.42 motion alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel for failure to investigate and discover that one of
appellant’s prior felony convictions (for persistent felony
offender purposes) was actually a misdemeanor for which
appellant had served out his sentence more than five years
before commission of the present offenses. Because the record refutes appellant’s allegation that the prior conviction was a
misdemeanor and because only one prior felony conviction needs
to be within five years of the present offense pursuant to KRS
532.080(3)(c)1, we affirm the denial of the RCr 11.42 motion
without a hearing.
Terry G. Helm brings this pro se appeal from a
January 8, 2004, order of the Lyon Circuit Court denying his Ky.
R. Civ. P. (CR) 60.02 motion to modify the final judgment
entered on his guilty plea to robbery in the first degree. We
affirm.
In 1995, in Daviess Circuit Court,
Vincente Bernardo Helm was charged with numerous felonies in
four separate indictments, 95-CR-00002, 95-CR-00050, 95-CR-00127
and 95-CR-00163. On June 19, 1995, Helm entered a plea, pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford,2 to the felonies contained
in the various indictments after accepting the Commonwealth’s
plea offer in which the prosecutor agreed to recommend that Helm
serve an aggregate sentence of twenty years in prison. On October 31, 1996, Helm filed a motion to vacate his
conviction pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure
(RCr) 11.42, claiming that his trial attorney rendered
ineffective assistance. Helm’s motion was denied on December
12, 1996.
Some seven years later, on January 20, 2004, Helm
filed a motion to vacate his conviction pursuant to Kentucky
Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 60.02(f).
Keith Helton appeals from
his conviction and sentence to two and one-half years in prison for the
offense of criminal possession of a forged prescription in violation of KRS1
218A.284. The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying
Helton’s motion for a directed verdict. We conclude that it did not, and we
thus affirm.
Charles Helton appeals from the denial of his
motion under Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 60.02 for
extraordinary relief from his life sentence for two counts of
first-degree rape. The Pulaski Circuit Court summarily denied
his motion for relief. Helton, pro se, appeals, arguing that he
is entitled to relief because he was sedated for over twenty
years and not competent to raise these claims until recently.
He claims that evidence of two doctors' reports which would show
that the child victims had not been sexually active in 1978 or
1979 had been concealed from him at the time of trial. We
disagree that he is entitled to relief on this basis.
James M. Hembree appeals from a judgment of
the Bell Circuit Court wherein he was convicted of possession of
a controlled substance and was sentenced to one year in prison.
The issue is whether the evidence was sufficient to support the
jury’s verdict. We believe it was, and thus affirm.
Gregory Henderson brings this appeal from an
April 8, 2004, judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court upon a
jury verdict finding him guilty of first-degree trafficking in a
controlled substance, public intoxication, and with being a
first-degree persistent felony offender. We affirm.
Earnest Dean Hendrickson was tried by jury and found guilty of manufacturing and possession of methamphetamine (enhanced by possession of a firearm), and felony and misdemeanor possession of other controlled substances. His sentences totaled eighteen years’ imprisonment. He appeals.
Travis Jay Hendrix appeals from his conviction for second degree arson for starting a fire at the home of Wayne and Peggy Lewis, a bi-racial couple. The sole basis for Hendrix’s appeal is that the trial court erroneously allowed the introduction of inappropriate KRE1 404(b) evidence. On review, we affirm.
Appellant, Jesse Hensley (Hensley), appeals Pro
Se the Harlan Circuit Court’s denial of his motion pursuant to
RCr 11.42. The Harlan Circuit Court’s ruling is affirmed.
Hensley was charged with assaulting his wife, causing
acute peritonitis that eventually led to her death. Hensley was
convicted of wanton murder. He asserts that years after his
conviction a relative made him aware that the Commonwealth had
offered him a plea bargain agreement.
Jacob Henson appeals from a judgment of
conviction following his conditional plea of guilty2 to two drug
possession charges and a charge of flagrant non-support in which
he reserved the right to appeal the circuit court’s denial of
his motion to suppress the evidence. Henson claims an anonymous tip given to the police indicating that he was in possession of
drugs did not provide the officers with probable cause to stop
the vehicle in which he was a passenger. Because we conclude
that the circuit court used the proper standard?that of
reasonable suspicion?and did not err in denying the motion, we
affirm.
By judgment entered January 21, 2003, the Clinton
Circuit Court convicted Georgi Hernandez, pursuant to his guilty
plea, of first-degree unlawful transaction with a minor under
sixteen years old, a class B felony,1 and sentenced him to ten
years in prison, the minimum sentence for a felony of that
class. Hernandez appeals from the circuit court’s July 10,
2004, order denying his RCr 11.42 motion for relief from that judgment. He contends that trial counsel neglected a viable
defense and thus rendered ineffective assistance and further
contends that the trial court erred by failing to hold an
evidentiary hearing on that claim. We agree with the trial
court, however, that the record refutes Hernandez’s ineffective assistance
claim and therefore affirm.
Erick Hicks challenges as erroneous a
judgment convicting him of the offenses of theft by unlawful
taking over $300, possession of burglary tools, and being a
persistent felon in the first degree. Alleging the denial of
his right to a fair trial, appellant advances six arguments for
reversal: 1) that there was proof that the verdict was tainted when the jury foreman informed the trial judge after they had
been dismissed that the jury had given little thought to the
value of the property taken; 2) that it was error to allow an
unreliable valuation of the stolen items to be presented to the
jury; 3) that the police failed to maintain a chain of custody
or properly inventory the stolen property; 4) that he was
entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal on the charge of
possession of burglary tools; 5) that he was the victim of
racial bias and selective enforcement in the manner in which he
was charged; and 6) that he was entitled to a mistrial following
a witness’s statement concerning a matter the trial judge had
ruled inadmissible as a prior bad act. We affirm.
James Dale Hightower separately appeals from orders of the McCracken Circuit Court denying his motions for production of records and to vacate his conviction pursuant to RCr 11.42. Hightower has failed to file a timely appeal from the trial court’s denial of his records motion, and therefore, we must dismiss this appeal. We also find that the record clearly refutes Hightower's claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Hence, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Hightower’s RCr 11.42 motion.
James Brandon Hill has appealed from a final
judgment entered by the Carroll Circuit Court on July 1, 2003,
following a jury verdict finding him guilty of the offense of
tampering with physical evidence.1 Having concluded that Hill
was entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal on the charge of
tampering with physical evidence and that the jury should have
been instructed on attempted tampering with physical evidence,
we reverse his conviction and one-year prison sentence. We further conclude that the imposition of a $1,000.00 fine on Hill
was not authorized by law.
Willie Ray Hines brings this appeal from a March
11, 2004, judgment of the Logan Circuit Court upon a jury
verdict finding appellant guilty of theft by failure to make
required distribution of property (Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 514.070). We affirm.
William Hodge appeals from a May 20, 2004, order
of the Hickman Circuit Court summarily denying his RCr 11.42
motion for post-conviction relief. Hodge asserts that, due to
counsel’s ineffective assistance, he pled guilty to a charge for
which there was no factual basis. Because the record does not
clearly refute Hodge’s assertion, we vacate and remand for an
evidentiary hearing.
Anthony A. Hogue, Jr.,
appeals from an order of the Henderson Circuit Court denying his motion to
withdraw his guilty pleas to criminal charges. His appeal is not supported by
any credible argument, and we thus affirm.
Appellant Cassandra Holland was convicted by a McCracken County jury of manslaughter in the first degree and arson in the third degree. The facts at trial showed that appellant set her husband on fire by throwing gasoline on him and lighting it with a match. The sole issue appealed is whether appellant should be considered a violent offender for purposes of limiting her parole eligibility, KRS 439.3401, or whether she is exempted from that status by virtue of being a victim of domestic violence. Appellant, and the Kentucky Domestic Violence Association as amicus curiae, assert that she is precisely the type of individual the General Assembly had in mind when it established that domestic violence victims who kill their abusers are exempt from the parole restrictions of the violent offender statute.
Taurus Hollins has appealed from a final judgment and sentence of imprisonment from the Logan Circuit Court entered on March 9, 2004, convicting him of three counts of trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree1 and being a persistent felony offender in the second degree (PFO II)2 and sentencing him to prison for 15 years. Having concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hollins’s motion for a mistrial after a witness testified regarding other uncharged crimes allegedly committed by him, that evidence of laboratory results regarding the controlled substances should not have been suppressed due to delay in production of the lab report, that Hollins was not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal based upon insufficient evidence, and that the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s closing argument was not improper, we affirm.
Demarcus Hollingsworth appeals from an order of
the Madison Circuit Court overruling his motion to suppress
evidence and statements taken from him after his arrest.
Hollingsworth contends that officers lacked probable cause to
arrest him without a warrant. Probable cause to arrest
Hollingsworth existed after officers were able to corroborate
-2-
tips predicting his future behavior. Thus, the judgment of the
Madison Circuit Court is affirmed.
Holt V Com , 2003-CA-001329 -- Not To Be
Published;Affirming -- PDF
Theron Holt entered a conditional guilty
plea to lesser offenses after being indicted with three codefendants
in connection with a robbery. Holt argues that the
indictment against him should have been dismissed due to
prosecutorial misconduct because the prosecutor entered into a
plea agreement with one of the co-defendants that required the
co-defendant to “not attempt to provide exculpatory evidence” in
Holt’s case. Although the choice of words used by the Commonwealth in its plea agreement with the co-defendant was
less than desirable, we conclude, having reviewed the record as
a whole, that Holt’s rights were not violated and that the
prosecutor did not engage in prosecutorial misconduct. Thus, we
affirm.
Appellant Shalako Kwabene Hooper appeals the
order of the Jefferson Circuit Court which denied his motion to
alter, amend or vacate his sentence pursuant to RCr 11.42.
Hooper pled guilty in May 2002 in the Jefferson Circuit Court to trafficking in a controlled substance (cocaine) in the first
degree while in possession of a firearm, possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon, illegal possession of drug paraphernalia
while in possession of a firearm, illegal possession of a
controlled substance (marijuana) while in possession of a
firearm, and being a persistent felony offender in the second
degree.
Ronald Horn appeals from the decisions of the
Henry Circuit Court and the Oldham Circuit Court denying his
petitions for extraordinary relief under RCr 11.42 and Civil
Rule 60.02. Horn was on probation for sexual offenses in both
Henry and Oldham counties, and his probation in both counties was revoked for new offenses in Oldham County. Horn claimed in
his motion for relief that the Commonwealth did not properly
seek revocation of his probation within ninety days of the
grounds for revocation coming to light, and that his counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to the revocation on those
grounds. The circuit court denied Horn's motion without
conducting an evidentiary hearing. Because the applicable rule
allows the Commonwealth prosecutorial discretion to give notice
of a possible violation of probation to the Department of
Corrections, and because the revocation was ultimately based on
Horn's conviction of new charges as well as violation of the
terms of his probation, we affirm.
Bruce Horton appeals from an order of the Jefferson Circuit Court denying his motion pursuant to CR 60.02 for modification or reduction of his sentence. He asserts that the trial court erred by failing to consider the merits of his allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel and newly discovered evidence. Finding no error, we affirm.
Gary Hoskins appeals from
an order of the Harlan Circuit Court denying his motion for correction of
sentence filed pursuant to CR1 60.02(f). We conclude that the circuit court
properly denied Hoskins’s motion and thus affirm. As a result of an incident
that occurred on May 19, 1990, Hoskins was indicted by a Harlan County grand
jury on charges of murder, first-degree robbery, first-degree burglary, and
first-degree arson. In accordance with a plea agreement
Gary Hoskins appeals from an order of the
Harlan Circuit Court denying his motion for correction of
sentence filed pursuant to CR 1 60.02(f). We conclude that the
circuit court properly denied Hoskins’s motion and thus affirm.
Appellant, Clifford Humfleet (Humfleet), appeals
the Laurel Circuit Court’s denial of his motion pursuant to RCr
11.42. Humfleet also appeals the circuit court’s denial of his
request for an evidentiary hearing. We affirm the trial court’s
ruling.
Humfleet was convicted of the manufacturing of
methamphetamine. He was sentenced to serve twenty years. The
Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed Humfleet’s conviction on direct
appeal.
Robbie D. Hounshell (Hounshell) appeals the order of the Lee Circuit Court denying his motion to amend the final judgment brought alternatively under RCr 10.10 for a clerical mistake or RCr 10.26 for a substantial error. Because we conclude there was no error -- either clerical or substantial -- we affirm.
Matthew Howard, pro se, appeals from an
order of August 18, 2003, of the Daviess Circuit Court which
denied his post-conviction motion for relief filed pursuant to
RCr 1 11.42. As we have found no error, we affirm.
Appellants, Jimmy Howard (Howard) and
Dick Adams, Attorney (Adams), have petitioned for review of an
opinion of the Workers’ Compensation Board (Board) entered on
November 5, 2004, which affirmed a decision of the
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) rendered on July 9, 2004, that
denied Adams an attorney fee for services rendered to Howard in
obtaining an award of Retraining Incentive Benefits (RIB)
against appellee Peabody Coal Company (Peabody).
Burrell Howell appeals from an order of the Henderson Circuit Court overruling, in part, his motion to be provided, without charge, various information pertaining to his case. The trial court granted that portion of Howell’s motion requesting that he be provided with a copy of the indictment in the case, but denied that portion of the motion seeking a copy of the emergency room records and DNA tests performed on him and the victims in the case, and a copy of the trial court’s January 20, 1998,2 order denying Howell’s petition for relief pursuant to RCr3 11.42. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
Coy Lee Hudson appeals from an opinion and order of the Fayette Circuit Court denying his motion for RCr 10.26 relief. He argues that the circuit court committed reversible error in failing to rule that the trial judge violated RCr 8.10 by initially accepting the Commonwealth’s recommended sentence but subsequently increasing it. Hudson maintains that he is entitled to an order reversing the matter and remanding with instructions that the trial court impose the recommended sentence. For the reason stated below, we affirm the order on appeal.
Reginald Hughes appeals from a judgment
entered by the Kenton Circuit Court after a jury verdict
convicted him of possession of a handgun by a convicted felon.
Hughes argues that the statements he made to police should have
been suppressed because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion
to stop him, that common law exceptions allowed him to have brief
possession of a firearm, and he that received ineffective
assistance of counsel. Finding no error, we affirm.
Arvin Hume appeals from an order entered by the Monroe Circuit Court revoking his probation and imposing a 90-day sentence. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand.
Kenneth Hunt (Hunt) brings this appeal from an
April 21, 2003, order of the Greenup Circuit Court. We affirm.
Hunt was indicted in 1998 by the Greenup County Grand
Jury upon charges of trafficking within 1000 yards of a school
(98-CR-00116); and upon trafficking within 1000 yards of a
school, possession of a hand gun by a convicted felon, unlawful possession of a police radio, possession of marijuana, and
first-degree persistent felony offender (98-CR-00133); and
escape in the second degree (98-CR-00183).
Kenneth Hunt (Hunt) brings this appeal from an
April 21, 2003, order of the Greenup Circuit Court. We affirm.
Hunt was indicted in 1998 by the Greenup County Grand
Jury upon charges of trafficking within 1000 yards of a school
(98-CR-00116); and upon trafficking within 1000 yards of a
school, possession of a hand gun by a convicted felon, unlawful
possession of a police radio, possession of marijuana, and first-degree persistent felony offender (98-CR-00133); and
escape in the second degree (98-CR-00183). He was arraigned on
all charges, and entered into a plea agreement with the
Commonwealth. Pursuant to the agreement, Hunt pled guilty on
all of the above charges in exchange for the Commonwealth’s
recommended sentence of six years’ imprisonment and dismissal of
the persistent felony offender charge.
Appellant Earl F. Hunt (Hunt) brings this
appeal from a “Judgment on Conditional Guilty Plea2 and Sentence
of Probation pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25,
91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970),” entered by the Fayette
Circuit Court on August 18, 2004. Hunt, originally indicted for
felony possession of drug paraphernalia, pleaded guilty to an amended charge of misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia,
reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to
suppress.3 His sixty-day jail sentence was probated for one
year. Having concluded that the trial court properly denied
Hunt’s motion to suppress, we affirm.
A jury convicted Timothy Hutchinson (Hutchinson) of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. In this matter of right appeal, Hutchinson challenges the validity of the search warrant that law enforcement obtained to search Hutchinson’s residence where they discovered the handgun underlying his charge and conviction. In the lower court proceedings, the trial court heard the challenge on Hutchinson’s motion to suppress. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied the motion. Because we find no error in the ruling of the trial court, we affirm.
This matter is before the Court on
remand by the Kentucky Supreme Court per order dated September 16, 2004. The Supreme Court
vacated our opinion entered October 31, 2003, and ordered us to reach the merits of the above-styled
appeal. After having considered the merits, we reverse and remand.
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