2006 Unpublished Court of Appeals Opinions Index |
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Cagle v Com.,2005-CA-000835
--Not Published ; Affirming in Part, Vacating in Part and Remanding
-- PDF
Calloway V Com.,2005-CA-000589
-- Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Cansler v Com.,2005-CA-000759
-- Not Published, Affirming --
PDF
Carneal v Com, 2004-CA-001534
-- Published ; Vacating and Remanding
-- PDF
Carneal V Com.,2004-CA-001534
-- Published ; Vacating and Remanding -- PDF
Carpenter V Com.,2004-CA-002469
-- Not Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Carpenter v Jailer, 2005-CA-000309
-- Not Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Carpenter v Com., 2006-CA-000028
-- Not Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Carrender V Com.,2005-CA-001485
-- Not Published ; Reversing and Remanding
-- PDF
Casebier v Com., 2006-CA-000208
-- Not Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Cashwell v Com.,2005-CA-001200
--Not Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Castile v Com ,2005-CA-001081
-Not Published ;Affirming
-- PDF
Chadwell v Com., 2004-CA-001673
-- Published ; Reversing
-- PDF
Chambers v Com.,2005-CA-000815
--Not Published, Affirming --
PDF
Chambers v Com.,2006-CA-000607
-- Not Published, Affirming --
PDF
Chapa v Com., 2005-CA-001082
-- Not Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Chester v Com. , 2006-CA-000530
-- Not Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Chilton v Com.,2004-CA-002276
--Not Published, Affirming --
PDF
Clemons v Com. 2004-CA-002351--Not To Be Published;
Affirming -- PDF Clemmons Jr. V Com.,2005-CA-000548
--Not Published ; Affirming -- PDF
Clements v Com.,2005-CA-000556
-- Published,Vacating and Remanding --
PDF
Clements v Com, 2005-CA-000556
-- Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Cloud v Com.,2005-CA-001070
-- Not Published, Affirming --
PDF
Coleman v Com, 2004-CA-001134--Not To Be Published;
Affirming -- PDF Coleman v Com, 2005-CA-000557--Not To Be Published;
Affirming -- PDF Collins v Com,2004-CA-001791
-- Not Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Com V Baldwin,2004-CA-002528
-- Published ; Reversing and Remanding
-- PDF
Com. v Bunch,2005-CA-001330
--Not Published, Reversing and Remanding --
PDF
Com. v Disponett, 2005-CA-002575
-- Not Published ; Vacating and Remanding
-- PDF
Com. v Fields,2005-CA-002574
-- Not Published ; Vacating and Remanding
-- PDF
Com. V Filben, 2004-CA-002207
-- Published ; OPINION
Affirming in Part, Reversing in Part, and Remanding
-- PDF
Com. v Groves and Groves V Com.,2005-CA-002573
-- Published ; Vacating and Remanding
-- PDF
Com. v Hakim,2005-CA-001064
-- Not Published, Affirming --
PDF
Com.V Hughes, 2005-CA-002576
-- Not Published ; Vacating and Remanding
-- PDF
Com. v Ingram,2005-CA-000062
--To Be Published ;Affirming
-- PDF
Com.v Ingram,2005-CA-000062
--Not Published,Reversing --
PDF
Com. V Redd, 2005-CA-000068
--Not Published ; Opinion Reversing and Remanding As To
2005-CA-000068-MR and Affirming As To 2005-CA-000301-MR
-- PDF
Com. v Spalding,2005-CA-001315
-- Published, Reversing --
PDF
Com v Shouse 2005-CA-000071-- To Be Published;
Affirming -- PDF Com. v Wooten 2004-CA-002334--Not To Be Published;
Affirming -- PDF Com. v Strohofer , 2005-CA-001892
-- Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Combs v Com., 2005-CA-001781
--Not Published, Vacating and Remanding --
PDF
Conley v Com.,2005-CA-001897
--Not Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Cook
v Com.,2004-CA-002044
--Not Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Cook v Com.,2005-CA-001174
-- Not Published, Affirming --
PDF
Coomer v Com, 2004-CA-002451
-- Not Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Cowhead v Com.,2005-CA-001708
--Not Published, Vacating and Remanding --
PDF
Crabtree v Com, 2003-CA-000797
-- Not Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Cresie V Com.,2005-CA-000649
-- Not Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Crick v Com.,2005-CA-002270
-- Not Published, Affirming --
PDF
Crumes v Com, 2005-CA-001004
--Not Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Charles Brian Russell appeals from a judgment
entered by the Jefferson Circuit Court after Russell sought to
set aside his guilty plea. For the reasons stated hereafter, we
reverse the court’s judgment and remand this matter for further
proceedings.
Carl Calloway appeals from a judgment of the
Daviess Circuit Court finding him guilty of first-degree sexual
abuse and sentencing him to serve one year. He argues that the
trial court improperly allowed rebuttal testimony on a
collateral matter and that the Commonwealth failed to prove all
of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. We
disagree and affirm the trial court.
Joanna Cansler appeals from the Harlan Circuit
Court’s judgment sentencing her to twelve years’ imprisonment
after a jury found her guilty of first-degree trafficking in a
controlled substance (second offense). For the following
reasons, we affirm the judgment.
In October 1998, Michael Carneal pled guilty but
mentally ill in McCracken Circuit Court to three counts of
murder,1 five counts of attempted murder,2 and first-degree
burglary.3 Carneal had taken several guns from a friend’s garage
and had used one of them on the morning of December 1, 1997, to
shoot eight of his young classmates at Heath High School in Paducah.
In October 1998, Michael Carneal pled guilty but
mentally ill in McCracken Circuit Court to three counts of
murder,3 five counts of attempted murder,4 and first-degree burglary.5 Carneal had taken several guns from a friend’s garage
and had used one of them on the morning of December 1, 1997, to
shoot eight of his young classmates at Heath High School in
Paducah. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court
entered judgment on December 21, 1998, sentencing Carneal to
life in prison without parole for at least twenty-five years.
Because Carneal was a juvenile under sixteen years of age at the
time of the shootings, this was the maximum allowable sentence.6
Carneal was remanded to the custody of juvenile authorities,
where he remained until his eighteenth birthday on June 1, 2001,
when he was resentenced as an adult to adult incarceration.
Three years to the day later, on June 1, 2004, Carneal moved for
relief from his judgment on the ground that his schizophrenia
rendered him incompetent in October 1998 to plead guilty. By
order entered June 30, 2004, the trial court denied relief,
finding that Carneal’s motion was untimely and was otherwise
refuted by the record. It is from that order that Carneal has
appealed. Convinced that Carneal’s motion was timely filed
after he became an adult and that it presents sufficient
evidence of incompetence to warrant a hearing, we vacate the
trial court’s order and remand for additional proceedings.
Clarence Carpenter appeals from the Jefferson
Circuit Court’s judgment sentencing him to five years’
imprisonment after a jury found him guilty of first-degree
trafficking in a controlled substance (crack cocaine). For the
following reasons, we affirm.
Jeffery L. Carpenter brings this pro se appeal
from a September 2, 2003, judgment on the pleadings of the Logan
Circuit Court dismissing his complaint for damages under the
open records act (Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 61.872-
61.884). We affirm.
Jeffery L. Carpenter brings this pro se appeal
from a May 3, 2004, order of the Logan Circuit Court summarily
denying his Ky. R. Crim. P. (RCr) 11.42 motion as time-barred.
We affirm.
Calvin Wayne Carrender appeals from a May 13,
2005, Pulaski Circuit Court order denying his motions to set
aside his conviction pursuant to RCr 11.42 and to appoint
counsel for him. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the record does not clearly refute Carrender’s claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Hence, we reverse the trial
court’s order and remand for appointment of counsel and an
evidentiary hearing on the merits of the motion.
Jansan Casebier appeals from an order of
the Daviess Circuit Court denying his motion for post-conviction
relief pursuant to CR2 60.02. Casebier contends that because the
judgment in the present case does not address whether his twoyear
sentence is to run concurrently or consecutively with a
prior five-year conviction in Ohio Circuit Court, the sentences should be deemed to run concurrently pursuant to KRS3 532.110(2).
For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
William Cashwell appeals from an order of
the Kenton Circuit Court of May 2, 2005, revoking his probation
and ordering that he serve his prison sentence consecutively as
to two concurrent sentences that had been imposed by the
Campbell Circuit Court. Cashwell argues that under the terms of KRS2 533.040(3), the Kenton and Campbell sentences must be served
concurrently because the revocation of his probation occurred
more than ninety (90) days after the Department of Corrections
became aware of the grounds for revocation. Cashwell is correct
in arguing that the revocation of probation by the Kenton
Circuit Court was indeed untimely for the purposes of KRS
533.040(3). However, that statute does not apply because a
previous order of the Campbell Circuit Court had already
directed that the sentences were to be served consecutively as
mandated under KRS 533.060(3). Accordingly, we affirm the order
of the Kenton Circuit Court.
Jeffrey Castile has appealed from the
McCracken Circuit Court’s May 18, 2005, Final Judgment and order
denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to Third Degree
Sexual Abuse. We affirm.
Linda B. Chadwell appeals from a judgment
entered by the Owen Circuit Court after she and numerous
codefendants were found guilty of multiple drug-related offenses
including, in her case, engaging in organized crime and
trafficking in five or more pounds of marijuana as a principal
or accomplice. We agree with her assertion that the trial court erred by failing to direct a verdict in her favor. Hence, we
reverse.
Marcus Chambers has appealed from a judgment
entered by the Fayette Circuit Court on March 22, 2005, as a
result of a conditional guilty plea to possession of a
controlled substance in the first degree (cocaine),1 fleeing and
evading the police in the second degree,2 and giving a police
officer a false name.3 Having concluded that the trial court did
not err in denying the motion to suppress evidence, we affirm.
Danny Chambers appeals from an order of the
Lee Circuit Court denying his motion to correct, vacate or set
aside judgment pursuant to CR 60.02. Chambers argues that he
was denied due process and equal protection when the trial court
imposed the maximum sentence even though the jury was unable to
agree on the recommended sentence. For the reasons stated
below, we affirm the order on appeal.
Gregory Chapa appeals from an order of the Kenton Circuit Court denying his motion to vacate his conviction and sentence pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 60.02. We affirm.
On May 27, 2005, a Christian County grand jury
returned an indictment charging Leslie Chester with seconddegree
robbery, kidnapping, first-degree attempted sodomy, and
alcohol intoxication. The matter proceeded to a jury trial on
October 31, 2005. The trial court granted Chester a directed
verdict on the charges of attempted sodomy and alcohol
intoxication. The jury acquitted Chester of the kidnapping charge, but found him guilty of second-degree robbery.
Following the penalty phase, the jury fixed Chester’s sentence
at ten years’ imprisonment, which the trial court imposed. On
appeal, Chester contends that he was entitled to a directed
verdict on the robbery charge, and he raises an unpreserved
issue regarding the admissibility of a witness’s identification
of him in a show-up procedure. Finding no error, we affirm.
Michael Chilton was a deputy sheriff for the
Daviess County Sheriff’s Department. In that capacity, he also
served as a patrolman, the DARE officer, and the school resource
officer at Apollo High School in Owensboro, Kentucky. Chilton
was removed from the latter position after a complaint was filed
against him. He was returned to patrol duty, but later was
terminated from the sheriff’s office in early 2003.
Appellant, Derek Clemons, was charged with trafficking in a controlled substance, third degree and unrelated vehicular charges. Clemons entered an Alford plea to the charges. On appeal Clemons denies that he was trafficking in Xanax, claiming that he possessed it for personal use. He also contends that the search of his vehicle was improper. We affirm the conviction.
Charles Clemmons was convicted by a Whitley
County jury of four counts of criminal possession of a forged
instrument in the second degree in connection with several
forged payroll checks. He appeals the final judgment of the
Whitley Circuit Court that sentenced him to three-years’
imprisonment on each charge -- to run concurrently. On appeal,
Clemmons challenges the admissibility of testimony from the Commonwealth’s witnesses regarding the counterfeit checks and
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions.
On June 3, 1989, William Jeffery
Clements and a high school friend broke into the home of one of
Clements’ neighbors in Jefferson County, and stole, amongst
other things, a beer mug, a radar detector, a stereo, a
University of Louisville parking permit and a bottle of Jim Beam
bourbon. The young men’s ill-gotten goods were valued at
approximately $755.00. Clements and his friend were quickly
arrested and charged with burglary in the second degree and theft by unlawful taking over $100.00, both Class D felonies.
At the time, Clements was eighteen years old.
On June 3, 1989, William Jeffery
Clements and a high school friend broke into the home of one of
Clements’ neighbors in Jefferson County, and stole, amongst
other things, a beer mug, a radar detector, a stereo, a
University of Louisville parking permit and a bottle of Jim Beam
bourbon. The young men’s ill-gotten goods were valued at
approximately $755.00. Clements and his friend were quickly arrested and charged with burglary in the second degree, a Class
C felony, and theft by unlawful taking over $100.00, a Class D
felony. At the time, Clements was eighteen years old.
On March 5, 2003, the Bell County grand
jury indicted James E. Cloud on one count each of robbery in the
first degree,2 and being a persistent felony offender in the
second degree.3 On January 27, 2004, Cloud accepted the
Commonwealth’s offer to plead guilty to the robbery charge in
exchange for a dismissal of the persistent felony offender charge. On March 1, 2004, the trial court sentenced Cloud to
twenty years’ imprisonment in accord with the Commonwealth’s
recommendation. Thereafter, Cloud filed pro se motions to set
aside his sentence pursuant to RCr 11.42 and to appoint counsel.
The trial court denied the motions without conducting an
evidentiary hearing or appointing counsel. This appeal
followed.
Lester Knox Coleman,1 pro se, has appealed2 from the May 28, 2004, order of the Fayette Circuit Court which denied his motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to RCr3 11.42.4 Having concluded that the trial court did not err in setting the terms of Coleman’s sentence and in finding that he received the effective assistance of counsel, we affirm.
Lester Knox Coleman,1 pro se, has appealed2 from the May 28, 2004, order of the Fayette Circuit Court which denied his motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to CR3 60.02(f).4 Having concluded that the trial court did not err in finding Coleman competent to stand trial and in finding he received effective assistance of counsel, we affirm.
Eugene Collins appeals from a judgment of
the Fayette Circuit Court convicting him of the crimes of thirddegree
burglary and possession of burglar’s tools and sentencing
him to three years in prison. We affirm.
The Commonwealth appeals from an order entered
by the Boone Circuit Court granting the motion of appellee Jason
Thomas Baldwin to suppress all evidence obtained from a search
which was conducted pursuant to a search warrant. For the
reasons stated hereafter, we reverse and remand for further
proceedings.
The Commonwealth of Kentucky appeals from an
order of the Marshall Circuit Court granting the motion of Ricky
Bunch to suppress evidence obtained during a search of Bunch’s
residence. The circuit court found that the search warrant was
improperly issued because it was based on the statement of a
confidential informant whose reliability was unproven. The
court also found that no independent investigation of the informant’s claims was undertaken. For the reasons stated
below, we reverse the order of the Marshall Circuit Court and
remand the matter for further proceedings.
This case arises from the Franklin Circuit
Court’s sua sponte dismissal of a three-count misdemeanor
indictment against Dave Disponett on the basis of the pardon
issued by Governor Fletcher in Executive Order 2005-924. The
Franklin County Special Grand Jury, summoned by the Attorney
General to investigate criminal violations of Kentucky’s merit
system hiring scheme, returned the indictment against Disponett.The Commonwealth raises three issues in its appeal, contesting
the validity of Governor Fletcher’s pardon, asserting that
Disponett did not accept the pardon and accordingly could not
benefit from it, and arguing that the circuit court did not have
jurisdiction over the misdemeanor indictment. While we disagree
with two of the Commonwealth’s arguments in light of the Supreme
Court of Kentucky’s recent decision of Fletcher v. Graham,2 we
agree that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to
dismiss the indictment. Accordingly, we vacate the circuit
court’s order and remand.
This case arises from the Franklin Circuit
Court’s sua sponte dismissal of a three-count misdemeanor
indictment against Vincent Fields on the basis of the pardon
issued by Governor Fletcher in Executive Order 2005-924. The
Franklin County Special Grand Jury, summoned by the Attorney
General to investigate criminal violations of Kentucky’s merit
system hiring scheme, returned the indictment against Fields.The Commonwealth raises three issues in its appeal, contesting
the validity of Governor Fletcher’s pardon, asserting that
Vincent did not accept the pardon and accordingly could not
benefit from it, and arguing that the circuit court did not have
jurisdiction over the misdemeanor indictment. While we disagree
with two of the Commonwealth’s arguments in light of the Supreme
Court of Kentucky’s recent decision of Fletcher v. Graham,2 we
agree that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to
dismiss the indictment. Accordingly, we vacate the circuit
court’s order and remand.
This matter is before us upon an Order
of this court dated July 28, 2005, granting discretionary
review.2 We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.
These cases arise from the Franklin Circuit
Court’s sua sponte dismissal of a two-count misdemeanor
indictment against Daniel Groves on the basis of the pardon
issued by Governor Fletcher in Executive Order 2005-924, as well
as the circuit court’s denial of Groves’ motion to quash the
indictment. The Franklin County Special Grand Jury, summoned by
the Attorney General to investigate criminal violations of
Kentucky’s merit system hiring scheme, returned the indictment
against Groves. The Commonwealth raises three issues in its
appeal, contesting the validity of Governor Fletcher’s pardon,
asserting that Groves did not accept the pardon and accordingly
could not benefit from it, and arguing that the circuit court
did not have jurisdiction over the misdemeanor indictment. In
his separate appeal, Groves asserts that the circuit court
should have quashed the indictment. While we disagree with two
of the Commonwealth’s arguments in light of the Supreme Court of
Kentucky’s recent decision of Fletcher v. Graham,2 we agree that
the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to dismiss the
indictment. Accordingly, we vacate the circuit court’s order
and remand.
Appellant, the Commonwealth of Kentucky, appeals
the Bath Circuit Court’s grant of shock probation to the
Appellee, Abdal-Azeez Jalal Hakim. We affirm.
This case arises from the Franklin Circuit
Court’s sua sponte dismissal of a two-count misdemeanor
indictment against J. Marshall Hughes on the basis of the pardon
issued by Governor Fletcher in Executive Order 2005-924. The
Franklin County Special Grand Jury, summoned by the Attorney
General to investigate criminal violations of Kentucky’s merit
system hiring scheme, returned the indictment against Hughes.
The Commonwealth raises three issues in its appeal, contesting the validity of Governor Fletcher’s pardon, asserting that
Hughes did not accept the pardon and accordingly could not
benefit from it, and arguing that the circuit court did not have
jurisdiction over the misdemeanor indictment. While we disagree
with two of the Commonwealth’s arguments in light of the Supreme
Court of Kentucky’s recent decision of Fletcher v. Graham,2 we
agree that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to
dismiss the indictment. Accordingly, we vacate the circuit
court’s order and remand.
This case is again before the court on the
Commonwealth’s appeal of an order of the Jefferson Circuit Court
granting Dwight Ingram’s motion to suppress evidence. A panel
of this court had remanded the case for reconsideration after
the circuit court had initially granted the motion. We affirm
the court’s order again granting Ingram’s motion.
This case is again before the court on the
Commonwealth’s appeal of an order of the Jefferson Circuit Court
granting Dwight Ingram’s motion to suppress evidence. A panel
of this court had remanded the case for reconsideration after
the circuit court had initially granted the motion. We reverse
the circuit court’s order that again granted Ingram’s motion.
Below Jaques Redd (Redd) was charged with
two drug charges and being a second-degree persistent felony
offender3 (PFO II). He brings appeal 2005-CA-000301-MR from a
judgment of the Christian Circuit Court upon a jury trial
adjudging him guilty on two counts of first-degree trafficking
in a controlled substance (cocaine)4 and sentencing him to two
respective ten-year concurrent terms of imprisonment. The
Commonwealth of Kentucky (Commonwealth) brings appeal 2005-CA-
000068-MR from an order of the Christian Circuit Court
dismissing the PFO II charge against Redd after the same jury
was unable to reach a verdict on the PFO II charge.
Gabriel Spalding entered a conditional guilty
plea in district court, and he was convicted of second-offense
driving under the influence (DUI).1 The circuit court reversed
this conviction on appeal, holding that the district court erred
by denying Spalding’s motion to suppress evidence against him
obtained during a traffic stop. On discretionary review, we
reverse the circuit court because we believe that the circuit
court erred by substituting its judgment as to the credibility
of witnesses and by misapplying the law.
The issue presented in this appeal is whether a defendant who has successfully completed a felony diversion program may have the records of his case expunged under KRS 431.076. We hold that under the facts of this case he can.
1 Senior Judge John Woods Potter sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
The Commonwealth of Kentucky appeals from orders of the Bracken Circuit Court that ultimately led to the court determining Deanna Gayle Wooten to be incompetent to stand trial on two counts of first-degree criminal abuse. We affirm.
The Commonwealth brings this appeal from
an order of the Mason Circuit Court entered August 15, 2005
dismissing the charges against Lisa Janelle Strohofer. For the
reasons stated below, we affirm.
Joshua Combs challenges on appeal the revocation
of his probation. Because the trial court’s revocation order
failed to make the requisite written factual findings concerning
the conditions of release that Combs violated, we must vacate
and remand.
Thomas Conley has appealed his June 16, 2005,
conviction following a jury trial in Pendleton Circuit Court for
Possession of a Firearm (Handgun) by a Convicted Felon (KRS
527.040) and for Resisting Arrest (KRS 520.090). He argues that
the circuit court should have directed a verdict in his favor on
both charges because the Commonwealth failed to establish sufficient proof to support a conviction on either charge. We
disagree. Therefore, we affirm.
Mary Cook has appealed from an order entered by
the Hardin Circuit Court on September 20, 2004, which denied her
pro se motion to vacate or set aside her sentence pursuant to
RCr2 11.42, without holding an evidentiary hearing. Having
concluded that the circuit court did not err in rejecting Cook’s
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on the basis of the
court record without holding an evidentiary hearing, we affirm.
This is an appeal from a judgment pursuant to
a jury verdict convicting appellant of theft by unlawful taking
over $300 for taking 100 wheels from a home scrap yard.
Appellant’s sole argument is that there was insufficient
evidence to sustain the conviction. Upon review of all the
evidence presented at trial, we believe the trial court properly refused to enter a directed verdict for appellant. Hence, we
affirm.
Monte Laron Coomer appeals his conviction
following a jury trial in the Fayette Circuit Court for
trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree,
possession of marijuana, and giving a peace officer a false
name. In this appeal, he contends that the evidence was
insufficient to convict him of the charges of trafficking in a
controlled substance and possession of marijuana. Coomer concedes that he did not preserve this claim of error for
appellate review since he failed to move for a directed verdict
at the close of all the evidence after the Commonwealth
introduced rebuttal evidence.
Carl Cowherd pled guilty to trafficking in
marijuana over five pounds, first degree Persistent Felony
Offender (PFO), trafficking in marijuana less than eight ounces
with a firearm, illegal possession of drug paraphernalia with a
firearm, and tampering with physical evidence. The Jefferson
Circuit Court accepted Cowherd’s plea and imposed the
recommended sentence of fifteen years’ imprisonment.
Roger G. Crabtree appeals from the judgment
of the Clinton Circuit Court sentencing him to serve five years
in prison after a jury convicted him of unlawful possession of a
methamphetamine precursor, pseudoephedrine. Crabtree alleges
four errors that he has failed to preserve for our review: that
the verdict was not supported by sufficient evidence; that the
Commonwealth failed to present competent evidence that the
substance he possessed was actually pseudoephedrine; that his
rights under the Fifth Amendment were violated by mention of the
fact that he had invoked his right to remain silent; and that
-2-
the Commonwealth improperly introduced evidence of a plea of
guilty by William Abbott, his co-indictee. Finding no error, we
affirm.
Tonya Cresie appeals from the judgment of the
Christian Circuit Court entered on a guilty plea to charges of
custodial interference. Cresie had picked up one of her
daughters from school in Evansville, Indiana and drove the child
back to Hopkinsville without the father’s consent or knowledge.
Counsel for Cresie has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 118 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967)
stating that there appeared to be no meritorious basis for the
-2-
appeal, requesting permission to withdraw and for the appellant
to be granted additional time in which to file a brief pro se if
she chose to do so, and to grant any relief to which this Court
may determine she is entitled. She appears not to have chosen
to file a brief with this court. We perceive no basis for
relief and affirm the judgment.
Jeffery L. Crick appeals from an order of
the Christian Circuit Court that denied his petition filed
pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 60.03 for writ
venire facias de novo and his subsequent motions for judgment by
default. We affirm.
Deon Crumes appeals from a judgment entered by
the Jefferson Circuit Court after a jury found him guilty of
first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance. For the
reasons stated hereafter, we affirm.
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