2006 Unpublished Court of Appeals Opinions Index |
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Dailey v Com.,2006-CA-000310
--Not Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Dauzat v Com., 2005-CA-002222
-- Not Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Davis V Com.,2005-CA-001109
--Not Published ; Affirming -- PDF
Davis v Com., 2005-CA-001298
-- Not Published ; Dismissing
-- PDF
Davidson v Com,2004-CA-000974
-- Published ; Affirming In Part And Reversing And Remanding In Part
-- PDF
Davidson v Com.,2005-CA-001524
--Not Published,Affirming --
PDF
Davis v Com.,2005-CA-001304
-- Not Published, Affirming --
PDF
Dean v Com, 2004-CA-002124--Not To Be Published;
Affirming -- PDF Dean v Com, 2004-CA-000089
-- Not Published ; Vacating and Remanding
-- PDF
Dean Jr. v Com.,2005-CA-002380
-- Not Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Delabar v Com., 2005-CA-001319
--Not Published ; Reversing and Remanding
-- PDF
Dennison V Com.,2005-CA-000566
--Not Published ; Affirming -- PDF
Denny v Com., 2004-CA-002322
--Not Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Denny Co v Com, 2004-CA-002502
--Not Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Derby v Com, 2004-CA-000959
-- Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
D.F. A Minor v Com.,2004-CA-001868
-- Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Dill v Com., 2005-CA-000275
-- Not Published ;Opinion and Order Dismissing Appeal
-- PDF
Dillard V Com.,2005-CA-000012
-- Not Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Dipietro v Com., 2005-CA-000312
-- Not Published ;Affirming
-- PDF
Dixon v Com.,2005-CA-001523
-- Not Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Dukes v Com., 2004-CA-002662
--Not Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Duncan v Com, 2004-CA-000832
-- Not Published ; Reversing and Remanding
-- PDF
Dunlap v Com.,2004-CA-002058
--Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Dunn v Com.,2005-CA-000468
-- Published, Affirming --
PDF
Dunn v Com.,2005-CA-000816
--Not Published, Affirming --
PDF
Durham v Com., 2004-CA-001921
-- Not Published ;Affirming
-- PDF
Ronald Dailey, pro se, appeals from the
circuit court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration of its
ruling that Dailey’s petition for habeas corpus was “factually
frivolous, malicious, or harassing.” Because the motion is
barred by the doctrines of res judicata and the law of the case,
we affirm.
Michael Dauzat (Dauzat) brings this
appeal from a judgment of the Christian Circuit Court entered
upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of second-degree burglary
and violation of a protective order. Dauzat contends that he
was entitled to a directed verdict upon the second-degree
burglary charge because he had a right to enter the victim’s residence, and, therefore, did not unlawfully enter the
dwelling. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
Ryan Davis appeals the judgment of conviction
rendered in Casey Circuit Court reflecting a jury verdict of
guilty on one count of first-degree robbery and one count of
first-degree burglary. Davis argues that the circuit court
committed reversible error in failing to instruct the jury on
robbery second, burglary second, receiving stolen property, and
facilitation to burglary and robbery. He also maintains that
circuit court erred permitting the Commonwealth’s use of parole eligibility guidelines. For the reasons stated below, we affirm
the judgment on appeal.
Demetrius Davis has appealed from the May 2,
2005, order of the Jefferson Circuit Court which dismissed his
motion for reconsideration of a bond assignment. Having
determined that Davis’s notice of appeal was untimely filed, we
must dismiss his appeal.
A Knox Circuit Court jury convicted Gary “Moose”
Davidson of first-degree unlawful imprisonment and second-degree
assault. He argues on direct appeal that the judgment of
conviction and sentence should be reversed because the trial
court erred when it failed to direct a verdict of acquittal on
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both charges. He asserts that the Commonwealth failed to
introduce sufficient evidence on one essential element of both
crimes. We disagree that the trial court erred when it refused
to direct a verdict. And we affirm the conviction for firstdegree
unlawful imprisonment. But we must reverse the seconddegree
assault conviction for a palpable error in the jury
instruction that allowed the jury to find that Davidson’s hands
were dangerous instruments as he used them to strike the victim.
While the evidence amply supported a finding that Davidson
inflicted a physical injury with his fists, it did not support a
finding that Davidson inflicted a serious physical injury with
his fists. And Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 500.080(3)
requires that in order for parts of the human body to qualify as
a dangerous instrument, the body part must directly cause a
serious physical injury. So the portion of the judgment
convicting Davidson of second-degree assault is reversed, and
the case is remanded for a retrial on fourth-degree assault.
Anthony Wendell Davidson was
convicted in the Jefferson Circuit Court of the murder of
Catherine Denise Johnson and of the sexual abuse of Johnson’s
11-year-old daughter. As a result, he was sentenced to life
without parole for 25 years. He now appeals the trial court’s
order denying his motion for relief from the judgment or in the alternative resentencing, which he filed pursuant to CR2 60.02.
We affirm.
Robert Davis appeals his conviction for
possession of a handgun by a convicted felon for which he was
sentenced to six years’ imprisonment. He advances three
arguments in support of his contention that his conviction must
be reversed: 1) that the trial court erred in refusing to
suppress evidence obtained in an improper search of his vehicle;
2) that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes his
conviction on the possession of a handgun charge; and 3) that he was entitled to directed verdict of acquittal. Finding no
reversible error in any of these contentions, we affirm.
Michael Dean appeals his conviction and sentence for two counts of second-degree criminal possession of a forged instrument and being a second-degree persistent felony offender. We affirm.
Appellant Charles Dean challenges his
probation revocation. He argues that probation officers
improperly searched a house he was in without having reasonable
suspicion to search. Additionally, he argues that the officers’
actions violated Department of Corrections’ policies and procedures. Finally, he argues that his probation revocation
was not conducted in accordance with the minimum due process
rights accorded probationers. We agree that appellant’s due
process rights were violated, and so we vacate and remand.
In July 1990, a Christian County jury
convicted Glenn Dean, Jr., of two counts of first-degree rape
and related offenses stemming from Dean’s and a codefendant’s
violent attack upon a sixteen-year-old girl. Dean was sentenced
to ninety years’ imprisonment. In Dean v. Commonwealth, 884
S.W.2d 417 (Ky. 1992), our Supreme Court upheld Dean’s
conviction and sentence. In September 2005, Dean moved for
relief from his 1990 conviction pursuant to CR 60.02. The
Christian Circuit Court denied that motion on October 13, 2005 and Dean has appealed. Dean contends that he was not accorded a
mandatory competency hearing prior to his 1990 trial and that
the circuit court erred by ruling that because Dean could have
raised this issue during his direct appeal he is precluded from
raising it now. Although our reasoning differs somewhat from
that of the trial court, we agree that Dean’s current motion is
untimely, and in any event Dean’s underlying claim is meritless.
Accordingly, we affirm.
Robert K. Delabar appeals from a
conditional guilty plea pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Criminal
Procedure (RCr) 8.09. Reserved for our review is the trial
court’s determination that Delabar is subject to persistent
felony offender (PFO) sentencing enhancement pursuant to
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 532.080. Delabar committed his present felony on the fifth anniversary of his release from
prison on a prior felony. Because we conclude that Delabar’s
release did not occur within the period called for in the
statute, we reverse.
This is an appeal from an order denying
appellant’s RCr 11.42 motion alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel. From our review of the record, the
trial court properly rejected appellant’s claims that his
trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing
to pursue an alcohol intoxication defense, failing to allow appellant to testify, failing to move for a competency
hearing, failing to submit adequate sentencing
instructions, and eliciting prejudicial and inadmissible
testimony from a witness. Hence, we affirm.
Johnny Denny, proceeding pro se, has appealed
from the Rockcastle Circuit Court’s order denying his RCr 11.42
motion to vacate his final judgment and sentence entered
pursuant to a guilty plea, as well as his motions for an
evidentiary hearing and for appointment of counsel. We affirm.
Denny Co appeals from an order of the
Franklin Circuit Court denying his motion to vacate his conviction and sentence pursuant to RCr3 11.42. The sole issue
is whether any failure by his trial counsel to advise him that
he might be subject to deportation upon his conviction
constitutes the ineffective assistance of counsel. In light of
the Kentucky Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Commonwealth v.
Fuartado, 170 S.W.3d 384 (Ky. 2005), we affirm.
Matthew Derry appeals from the judgment of the
Metcalfe Circuit Court accepting his conditional guilty plea to
first-degree sexual abuse and sentencing him to two years’
imprisonment and three years’ conditional discharge. The only
issue raised on appeal is whether the charge should have been
dismissed as violating his right against double jeopardy. We
find that double jeopardy did not attach when Derry requested a dismissal due to improper venue and, thus, affirm the trial
court.
D.F., a minor, was granted discretionary review
of an opinion and order entered by the Jefferson Circuit Court
on August 12, 2004, which affirmed an amended order of the
Jefferson District Court entered on April 6, 2004, which
modified a dispositional order by changing the amount of
restitution D.F. owed from $14.43 to $214.43. Having concluded
that the Jefferson District Court retained continuing
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jurisdiction over D.F.’s case when it entered the amended
restitution order, we affirm.
William Dill (Dill), pro se, brings this
appeal of an order of the McCracken Circuit Court, entered
January 18, 2005, denying his pro se motion to reconsider the
denial of his motion to vacate his five-year sentence arising
out of an unconditional guilty plea to second-degree trafficking
in a controlled substance (Lortab) and third-degree trafficking in a controlled substance (Xanax),2 pursuant to Kentucky Rules of
Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42. Because Dill did not timely
file his notice of appeal, we have no jurisdiction to consider
the appeal. Therefore, it must be dismissed.
Gary Dillard appeals pro se from an order of
the Christian Circuit Court denying his motion seeking RCr 11.42
relief. For the reasons stated hereafter, we affirm.
Edward Dipietro appeals an order of the
Hardin Circuit Court, revoking his probation and sentencing him
to serve eight years. He maintains that his due process rights
were violated because the terms of his probation were not
entered into the record at his revocation hearing, and because the circuit court failed to make written findings of fact to
support its decision to revoke his probation. We affirm.
Walter R. Dixon appeals pro se from the
Jefferson Circuit Court’s opinion and order denying his motion
for RCr 11.42 relief. Dixon argues three instances of
ineffective assistance of counsel, insufficiency of the
evidence, and prosecutorial misconduct. For the following
reasons, we affirm.
Larry Dukes, pro se, has appealed from the
November 12, 2004, order of the Hopkins Circuit Court which
denied his pro se motion to vacate judgment pursuant to CR2
60.02, without holding an evidentiary hearing. Having concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Dukes relief, we affirm.
Christopher Duncan was charged in an
indictment returned in Hancock Circuit Court with several drugrelated
offenses and with possession of a handgun and firearms
by a convicted felon. When Duncan was arrested on the charges,
the Hancock County Sheriff’s deputies who made the arrest seized
twenty five long rifles from his property. Duncan died before
he could be tried, and the indictment was dismissed on August
15, 2001.
Dow Dunlap entered a conditional guilty plea to
driving under the influence (DUI)1 in the Carroll District Court,
and his conviction was affirmed on appeal by the Carroll Circuit
Court. Having granted discretionary review, we conclude that
the district court did not err in denying Dunlap’s motions to
suppress evidence of his consumption of alcohol obtained during
a roadblock as a violation of KRS 189.125, which places restrictions on the enforcement of the seatbelt law, or as being
unconstitutional on due process grounds. Hence, we affirm.
Rico Dunn appeals from the Jessamine Circuit
Court’s judgment sentencing him to serve two years in prison
after he entered a conditional guilty plea to first-degree
possession of a controlled substance1 (cocaine). On appeal, Dunn
contends that the circuit court erred in failing to grant his
motion to suppress the evidence of cocaine found on his person.
For the following reasons, we affirm.
The issue in this appeal is whether a youthful
offender, who reaches eighteen years of age and is returned to
court for final sentencing, is subject to the violent offender
prohibition against probation. We agree with the trial court
that a youthful offender who is resentenced at eighteen is
subject to the violent offender prohibition on probation under
KRS 533.010(2). Hence, we affirm.
Stacy Durham appeals from a judgment of the
Wolfe Circuit Court entered on a conditional plea of guilty on
charges related to the manufacturing and trafficking of
methamphetamine. Durham argued below that Count III of the
indictment should be dismissed because the evidence was
insufficient for a jury to conclude that he possessed all of the chemicals necessary to manufacture methamphetamine. For the
reasons stated below, we affirm the judgment.
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