2006 Unpublished Court of Appeals Opinions Index |
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Taylor v Com, 2004-CA-001738
-- Not Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Taylor V Com.,2005-CA-000802
-- Not Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Taylor v Com.,2005-CA-000067
--Not Published, Affirming --
PDF
Taylor v Com.,2005-CA-000428
-- Not Published, Affirming --
PDF
Taylor v Com.,2005-CA-001637
-- Not Published, Affirming --
PDF
Thomas v Com., 2004-CA-002354
-- Not To Be Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Thomas V Com.,2005-CA-000224
--Not Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Thompson v Com.,2005-CA-002178
-- Not Published, Affirming --
PDF
Thompson v Com, 2005-CA-000429
-- Not Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Tinsley v Com.,2005-CA-000361
-- Published ; Reversing and Remanding
-- PDF
Tinsley v Com.,2005-CA-000482
--Not Published, Affirming --
PDF
Tokovic v Com, 2004-CA-002619
--Not To Be Published;
Affirming -- PDF Townsend v Com.,2005-CA-001291
-- Not Published, Affirming --
PDF
Troyer v Com., 2004-CA-002576
--Not To Be Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Tucker v Com., 2004-CA-002421
-- To Be Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
Turley v Com.,2005-CA-002195
-- Not Published, Affirming --
PDF
Tyler V Com.,2005-CA-000191
-- Not Published ; Affirming
-- PDF
On September 30, 2003, William Lamar
Taylor pleaded guilty to second-degree burglary, two counts of
third-degree rape, two counts of third-degree sodomy, and thirddegree
unlawful transaction with a minor. On November 18, 2003, in accordance with the plea agreement, he was sentenced to five
years’ imprisonment. He now appeals from a summary denial of
his RCr 11.42 motion wherein he alleged that his plea was not
knowingly and voluntarily entered because his counsel did not
inform him that he would have to complete a twenty-four month
sex offender treatment program before becoming eligible for
parole.
The single issue in this appeal is
whether the trial court erred in denying appellant’s CR 60.02
motion to modify the five-year sentence he received on July 5,
1989 for receiving stolen property. Appellant argues that under
KRS 446.110 he is entitled to avail himself of the more lenient
sentencing provisions of the amended version of KRS 514.110,
which became effective July 15, 1994. Finding no error in the decision of the trial court holding that appellant had been
properly sentenced under the statute in place at the time the
offence was committed, we affirm the denial of appellant’s
motion for CR 60.02 relief.
Appellant, Jeffery Taylor (Taylor), appeals the
McLean Circuit Court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence
seized in a search. We affirm the circuit court ruling.
Mark Wayne Taylor appeals from the Fayette
Circuit Court’s judgment sentencing him to sixteen years’
imprisonment after a jury found him guilty of first-degree
burglary. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Wilbur Taylor appeals from an order
of the Fayette Circuit Court denying his motion to vacate his
conviction and sentence pursuant to CR2 60.02. We affirm.
Kenneth W. Thomas appeals from a
judgment of conviction and sentence entered by the Hardin
Circuit Court. Thomas was convicted of two counts of
trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree, one
count of trafficking in a controlled substance near a school and
of being a persistent felony offender. Finding no error, we
affirm.
Francis Gerald Thomas appeals from the Jefferson
Circuit Court’s denial of his RCr1 11.42 motion. On review, we
affirm.
The opinion of the trial court correctly and
adequately sets out the applicable facts and law in this case.
We therefore adopt that opinion as our own:
On May 2, 2005, Defendant filed a
pleading entitled “Petition for Writ Venire
Facias De Novo” asking the Court to vacate
his sentence and conduct a sentencing
hearing pursuant to K.R.S. 532.025. In support of his Petition, Defendant claims
that he was:
“precluded and/or denied by the
trial court his statutory and
procedural right to present
mitigating evidence to the Court
and/or a capital sentencing jury
pursuant to K.R.S. 532.025(1) as
mandated, being charged with
Murder under K.R.S. 507.020(2);
resulting in a structural error of
first magnitude which abdicated
Mr. Thompson’s 6th, 8th and 14th
Amendment, U.S. Constitutional
Rights as herein specifically
averred.
Monty Thompson appeals from a single order of
the Calloway Circuit Court denying two motions, one made
pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42 and
the other pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR)
60.02. In both motions, Thompson sought to vacate his
conviction stemming from charges related to the manufacturing of methamphetamine. Thompson raises only one issue on appeal –
that his conviction must be set aside pursuant to the Kentucky
Supreme Court’s decision in Kotila v. Commonwealth, 114 S.W.3d
226 (Ky. 2003), which held that a defendant could not be
convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine if he possessed some,
but not all, of the chemicals or equipment necessary for the
drug’s manufacture. As Kotila is no longer the law in the
Commonwealth, we conclude that Thompson is not entitled to the
relief he seeks and, thus, we affirm.
James Arthur Tinsley appeals from a
“Final Judgment and Order Imposing Sentence” of the Hardin
Circuit Court entered upon a jury verdict.
Tinsley contends that the trial court erred by failing
to appoint counsel to represent him in the trial proceedings. Because the trial court improperly denied appointment of counsel
based upon the mere fact that a property bond had been posted to
secure Tinsley’s release following his indictment; did not apply
the factors to determine Tinsley's indigency as provided in
KRS 31.120; and, because it is otherwise not determinable from
the record whether Tinsley was in fact indigent, we reverse and
remand.
On August 2, 2004, a Daviess County grand jury
indicted James Lawrence Tinsley and Toriano Winstead on one
count each of third-degree burglary and being a first-degree
persistent felony offender. Following a trial, the jury
convicted both men of the charges. The jury fixed Tinsley’s
sentence at five years, enhanced to eighteen years by virtue of
his status as a PFO I. Similarly, the jury fixed Winstead’s
sentence at five years, enhanced to eighteen years by virtue of
his status as a PFO I. The trial court imposed the jury’s
sentences in both cases. Tinsley and Winstead separately appeal
from their convictions, and their appeals have been consolidated
before this Court. Finding no error, we affirm in both appeals.
Senad Tokovic appeals from the November 24, 2004, judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court, in which he was found guilty of Attempting to Escape from a Penitentiary and of being a 2nd degree Persistent Felony Offender, for which offenses he received an enhanced sentence of five years. We affirm.
Sherman Lewis Townsend appeals the judgment of
conviction rendered in Casey Circuit Court reflecting a jury
verdict of guilty on one count of first-degree robbery and one
count of first-degree burglary. Townsend argues that he was
entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal, and maintains that
the evidence did not support the Commonwealth’s alternate
theories of criminal conduct. For the reasons stated below, we
affirm the judgment on appeal.
Kevin Ray Troyer appeals from the judgment
of the Calloway Circuit Court convicting him of trafficking in a
controlled substance and sentencing him to prison for two and
one-half years. Troyer argues that the trial court erred by
denying his motions for directed verdict. We affirm.
Robert Tucker appeals from a judgment of the
Wayne Circuit Court wherein he was convicted of several offenses
and was sentenced to 10 years in prison. The judgment was based
on a conditional guilty plea entered by Tucker following the
denial of his motion to suppress evidence. The issue involves
whether the investigatory stop (Terry stop) that led to Tucker’s
arrest and conviction was valid. We affirm.
David Turley appeals from a conditional guilty plea entered in Franklin Circuit Court on one count each of first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance, second-degree trafficking in a controlled substance, and menacing. Turley filed a motion to suppress the evidence, and argues that the trial court erred in ruling that his arrest and subsequentsearch were lawful. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the judgment of the Franklin Circuit Court.
A McCracken Circuit Court jury convicted
Edmund Lee Tyler (Edmund) of one count of tampering with
physical evidence, one count of possession for sale of a
simulated controlled substance, and being a persistent felony
offender in the second degree (PFO II). In accordance with the
jury’s recommendation, the trial court sentenced him to three
years on the tampering charge, a $250 fine on the possession
charge and seven years on the PFO II charge, with the seven year
sentence to run in lieu of the other two sentences. He appeals
-2-
to this Court as a matter of right, contending that the trial
court committed reversible error by:...
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