2004 Kentucky Supreme Court Index |
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Caldwell v. Com., 2002-SC-000410-MR; - Published,
Affirming -- PDF -
Caldwell v. Com., 2003-SC-000155-TG - Published,
Affirming -- PDF - Text
Callihan v.Com, 2003-SC-000183-MR - To Be Published, Affirming -- PDF -
Campbell v. Com., 2002-SC-000013-MR - Not Published,
Affirming -- PDF -
Carrier v. Com., 2002-SC-000509-MR - Not To Be Published, Reversing -- PDF -
Cave v. Com., 2002-SC-000710-MR - Not Published,
Affirming -- PDF -
Chapman v. Com, 2003-SC-000512-MR -Not To Be
Published, Affirming -- PDF -
Cheek v.Com, 2003-SC-000094-MR -Not To Be Published, Affirming -- PDF -
Collett v.Com, 2002-SC-001025-MR -Not To Be Published, Affirming In Part Reversing And Remanding In Part -- PDF -
Collins v.Com, 2002-SC-000926-MR - To Be Published, Reversing And Remanding -- PDF -
Com v.Blakeman.,2001-SC-000666-MR - Not To Be
Published, Affirming -- PDF -
Com v. Morris, 2002-SC-000845-MR - To Be Published, Affirming -- PDF -
Com v.Reynolds, 2003-SC-000154-MR - To Be Published, Certifying The Law -- PDF -
Cook v. Com., 2002-SC-000486-MR - Published,
Affirming in Part and Vacating and Remanding in Part -- PDF
-
Cook v. Com., 2002-SC-001021-MR Not Published,
Affirming -- PDF
- Text
Cosby v.Com, 2002-SC-000806-MR - To Be Published, Affirming -- PDF -
Couch v. Com., 2002-SC-000345-MR; - Not Published,
Affirming -- PDF
-
Coyle v. Com, 2002-SC-000419-MR - Not To Be
Published, Affirming -- PDF -
Crum v.Com, 2003-SC-000610-MR -Not To Be Published, Affirming -- PDF -
Caldwell appeals from a judgment based on a jury verdict which convicted him of
one count of murder and theft over $300 . He was sentenced to life in prison and five
years concurrently . Caldwell also appeals from an order denying his motion for a new
trial based on newly discovered evidence.
Caldwell appeals from a judgment based on a jury verdict which convicted him of
one count of murder and theft over $300 . He was sentenced to life in prison and five
years concurrently . Caldwell also appeals from an order denying his motion for a new
trial based on newly discovered evidence.
Appellant, Richard Callihan, was indicted in the Greenup Circuit Court for two
counts of rape in the first degree (Counts I and II), one count of sodomy in the first
degree (Count III), and one count of criminal abuse in the first degree (Count IV). He
entered a guilty plea to all counts conditioned on the preservation of his right to appeal
the denial of his motion to suppress his confession .
RCr 8 .09. The trial court
sentenced him to twenty years imprisonment for Counts I through III and ten years
imprisonment for Count IV, to run concurrently for a total of twenty years . He appeals to
this court as a matter of right, Ky. Count. § 110(2)(b), on the grounds that the trial court
erroneously denied his motion to suppress his taped confession as it was obtained after
he had become the focus of the investigation and before the police informed him of his
right to counsel and his right to remain silent. Finding no error, we affirm .
A Fayette Circuit Court jury found Appellant guilty of one (1) count each of
First-Degree Rape and First-Degree Sodomy and also found him to be a
Second-Degree Persistent Felony Offender (PFO) .
Appellant, Clifford Carrier, entered a conditional guilty plea in the Livingston
Circuit Court to fifteen counts of sexual offenses against minors. He received a
sentence of ten years . On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions,
rejecting Appellant's claim that incriminating evidence contained in records obtained
from his psychologist should have been suppressed, as the evidence was (1)
wrongfully obtained, and (2) protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege
contained in KRE 507 . This being a matter of first impression in Kentucky, we granted discretionary review.
Joseph Bertrand Cave, pled guilty to eight counts of burglary, five counts of firstdegree
rape, four counts of first-degree sodomy, three counts of first-degree sexual
abuse, one count of attempted rape, and second-degree persistent felony offender.
Appellant, Earl Eugene
Chapman, was convicted of intentional murder and sentenced to life in prison .
He appeals to this Court as a matter of right, raising three allegations of
error. First, he argues that the trial court should have suppressed his
confession because (a) he did not voluntarily waive his Miranda rights, and
(b) his confession was coerced . Next, he argues that his conviction must be
reversed because the trial court failed to follow the proper procedure for
empanelling the jury. Finally, he argues the trial court erred in finding him
competent to stand trial ..
A Harlan Circuit Court jury found Marvin Lee Cheek, Appellant, guilty of Wanton
Murder, and sentenced him to twenty (20) years incarceration . He now appeals his
conviction to this Court as a matter of right. Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b) .
On November 13, 2001, Roger Fuson, the victim, was shot and killed at
Appellant's residence. Following the shooting, Appellant called 911, and informed the
operator that the victim had shot himself. The first officer on the scene, Trooper Slone,
interviewed those present, gathering information about the death of the victim .
Appellant told Trooper Slone in his first and second statements that Roger had shot
himself, though he admitted in his third statement to another officer that he had
accidentally shot Roger. He stated that he had listened to Roger, his cousin, talk about
committing suicide and wanted to scare him out of it. Appellant took the gun out from his nightstand while sitting on his bed with his friend, Teddy Smith . Appellant looked at
the safety, pointed it at Roger, who was standing nearby, and the gun fired.
A Leslie Circuit Court jury convicted Appellant, Fred Collett, of murder, as
principal or accomplice, assault in the first degree, as principal or accomplice, complicity
to robbery in the first degree, and arson in the first degree. The jury also found that the
murder was aggravated because it was accompanied by robbery and arson .' Appellant
was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for murder, twenty years
each for assault in the first degree and complicity to robbery in the first degree, and fifty
years for arson in the first degree, to run concurrently . Appellant appeals to this Court
as a matter of right, Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b), asserting the following claims of error, viz:
The Appellant, Mark Collins, appeals from an order of the Grant Circuit Court
denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a vehicular stop. The Court
of Appeals affirmed . This Court granted discretionary review. For the reasons set forth
below, we reverse and remand .
The material facts of this case are not disputed . An unidentified person called
911 around 8 :00 p .m . from a gas station located in Grant County. The caller
complained that the white, male driver of a white Chevrolet Blazer was seen throwing
liquid from a bottle toward another vehicle at the Ezy-Stop gas station in Williamstown .
The caller did not see the male throw the actual bottle, but identified the liquid as
alcohol . Further, the caller indicated that he or she perceived that there was a dispute
between the two drivers. The driver of the Blazer then pulled out of the gas station, proceeding southbound on I-75 . The caller was able to give the license plate number of
the Blazer.
This appeal is from a
judgment based on a jury verdict that convicted Blakeman of second-degree
assault, first-degree wanton endangerment, operating a motor vehicle under the
influence of alcohol and as a first-degree persistent felony offender. He was
sentenced to a total of forty years in prison . The questions presented are
whether it was error not to direct a verdict on the first-degree wanton
endangerment charge; whether it was error to admit evidence of other bad acts
and whether it was error not to grant a mistrial for the failure of the
prosecution to comply with a discovery order regarding the blood test evidence
.
On March 15, 2001, Troy Thornsberry and his pregnant wife, Veronica Jane
Thornsberry, were en route to Pikeville Methodist Hospital for the anticipated birth of
their unborn child when their vehicle was struck by a pickup truck operated by Appellee,
Christopher Charles Morris . Mr. Thornsberry was injured in the collision ; his wife and
unborn child were killed . A post-mortem examination revealed that the child was a
viable fetus who would have been born a healthy baby girl had she not sustained a fatal
brain injury in the collision.
Pursuant to CR 76 .37(10), the Commonwealth sought certification of the
law on issues regarding Driving Under the Influence ("DUI") prosecutions of persons
under the age of twenty-one, and this Court granted the certification request. The
precise issue here is whether the Commonwealth may prosecute persons under the
age of twenty-one years only under KRS 189A.01 0(1)(e), which creates a per se
violation for having a significantly lower alcohol concentration than the standard per se
violation, or whether the Commonwealth may elect to prosecute persons under twenty-one
under the standard per se violation subsection, KRS 189A.01 0(l)(a).
On August 20, 2001, Billy Joe and Lisa Rains were standing in the front yard of
their home on Bee Creek Road in Whitley County, Kentucky, when a 1984 Chevrolet
Corvette automobile operated by Appellant, Lester E. Cook, Jr., drove into their yard,
striking and killing Mrs. Rains
This appeal is from a judgment based on a jury verdict that convicted Cook of
complicity to commit murder. She was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility
of probation or parole for twenty-five years .
The questions presented are whether information about the victim was properly
admitted during the guilt phase ; whether improper opinion evidence by the police was
introduced through the videotaped statement of Cook; whether the admission of a prior
consistent statement of a prosecution witness was palpable error; whether the
introduction of incorrect minimum parole eligibility guidelines resulted in manifest
injustice ; and whether Cook was entitled to an instruction
This appeal poses the following issue of first impression : Where one is convicted
of or pleads guilty to a criminal offense, remains free on bond while waiting to be
sentenced, and in the interim perpetrates another crime, does the phrase "awaiting trial"
as set forth in KRS 533.060(3) apply so as to require the imposition of consecutive
sentences. For the reasons set forth below, we hold that it does and, therefore, affirm
the result of the opinion rendered by the Court of Appeals.
The facts are these. In June of 2000, the appellant, Montez Lamont Cosby,
agreed to waive his right to a jury determination of sentencing following his conviction
on a single offense and agreed to accept the Commonwealth's plea agreement. Cosby
also agreed to accept the Commonwealth's offer on two other charges and
subsequently entered a guilty plea . In exchange for Cosby's plea, the Commonwealth agreed to recommend a total sentence of fifteen years imprisonment.
A Knox Circuit Court jury found Appellant, Franklin Couch, guilty of First-Degree
Robbery and also found him to be a First-Degree Persistent Felony Offender (PFO) . In
accordance with the jury's sentencing-phase recommendation, the trial court imposed a
PFO-enhanced sentence of fifty (50) years.'
This appeal is from a
judgment based on a jury verdict that convicted Coyle of three counts of
second-degree rape and one count of first-degree rape. He was sentenced to a
total of fifty-five years in prison. The questions presented are whether the
trial judge erred in accepting the waiver by Coyle of joint representation ;
whether improper hearsay testimony was admitted ; whether proof of prior
charges against a codefendant was prejudicial to Coyle; whether Coyle was
entitled to a directed verdict; whether the testimony of child witnesses via
closed circuit television was proper; whether the trial judge erred in
consolidating the indictments ; whether the evidence supported an instruction
on sexual abuse; and whether the trial judge correctly excluded a prior
consistent statement.
An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that no reasonable cause was
shown for the claimant's failure to give notice that her back injury was work-related until
she filed a claim nearly two years later. The Workers' Compensation Board (Board) and
the Court of Appeals have affirmed . Likewise, we affirm .
The claimant alleged that on July 27, 1999, she suffered a lower back injury while
setting up a press..
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