Use Adobe's Conversion Tool to convert the following PDF files into text in the event that you are viewing this page with assistive technology that is not compatible.

Jackson v. Com., 2004-SC-000806-MR -Not To Be Published,Affirming -- PDF

Appellant, Michael Jackson, was convicted of murder and first-degree wanton endangerment . He was originally sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for twenty-five years for the murder and one year for the wanton endangerment with the sentences to run consecutively . On Appellant's initial appeal, in an unpublished memorandum opinion dated October 23, 2003, we remanded the case to the circuit court for a new penalty phase, holding that the sentence was impermissible because the jury had not found any aggravator that would allow the imposition of a life sentence without parole . On remand, Appellant was sentenced to forty-eight years imprisonment. Appellant argues that this sentence is also impermissible because the penalty phase jury was not adequately advised as to facts he implies were developed during the guilt phase of his trial . He appeals to this Court as a matter of right. Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b). Having found no error, we affirm Appellant's sentence .

Jackson v.Com., 2003-SC-000777-MR -Not To Be Published, Affirming -- PDF

Appellant, Matthew M. Jackson, was convicted of first-degree robbery by complicity (three counts) and first-degree burglary by complicity (three counts). Jackson was sentenced to a total of sixty years of imprisonment. He appeals to this court as a matter of right.' Raising two issues, Jackson requests that the judgment of the Warren Circuit Court be reversed and that the case be remanded to that court for a new trial. First, Jackson argues that the trial court committed reversible error in overruling his motions to excuse two prospective jurors for cause . Second, he contends that the trial court committed reversible error by admitting evidence of other crimes in violation of KRE 404(b) . We affirm .

Appellant, Matthew Dewayne Johnson, was indicted by grand jury of first degree rape, first degree sodomy, first degree sexual abuse and first degree criminal abuse against his three-year-old niece. The record reflects that Appellant was seventeen years old at the time of the crimes and underwent a youthful offender transfer hearing . The Commonwealth met its burden and the case was transferred to the Logan Circuit Court. During trial in Logan Circuit Court numerous witnesses were called by both the Commonwealth and defense counsel. The jury returned a verdict against Appellant finding him guilty of first degree rape and first degree sexual abuse . The jury recommended punishment of twenty years for first degree rape and five years for first degree sexual abuse, to run consecutively, for a total sentence of twenty-five years .

Johnson v. Com., 2004-SC-000516-MR -To Be Published, Affirming -- PDF

Appellant, Eugene Paul Johnson, was convicted of First-Degree Robbery by Complicity and of being a Second-Degree Persistent Felony Offender. On appeal, he makes four independent allegations of error: (1) that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction ; (2) that, during voir dire and in the presence of potential jurors, the prosecutor impermissibly defined the "reasonable doubt" standard; (3) that evidence of his alleged statements of intent to commit another robbery was improperly admitted; and (4) that the jury instructions were improper, violating his right to due process. Having found no error, we affirm Appellant's conviction .

Johnson v. Com., 2003-SC-000925-MR - Not To Be Published, Affirming -- PDF

Appellant, Barbara Faye Johnson, was convicted in the Bell Circuit Court of firstdegree robbery and sentenced to twenty years imprisonment. She appeals to this Court as a matter of right, Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b) . Finding no error, we affirm .

Jones v. Com.,2002-SC-001011-DG - Not To Be Published, Affirming -- PDF -

Appellant, William Ellis Jones, was originally tried for two counts of first degree robbery and one count of second degree persistent felony offender (PFO) . The robbery counts stemmed from two separate robberies of ATM customers at the same bank location in Louisville on different dates. Ultimately, the Appellant admitted to being the individual at the ATM location on July 27, 1997, when Cheryl Parris was robbed, and on September 14, 1997, when George Pinion was robbed. The Appellant denied that either encounter was a robbery; from his perspective both Parris and Pinion willingly gave him money, simply because he asked for it. The Appellant was tried and convicted on both robbery counts and on the second degree PFO count.