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Yenawine v. Com., 2003-SC-000283-MR -Not To Be Published, Reversing and Remanding -- PDF

Appellant, Samuel Yenawine, was convicted of arson in the first degree (KRS 513 .020), four misdemeanor counts of wanton endangerment in the second degree (KRS 508.070), tampering with physical evidence (KRS 524.100), and of being a persistent felony offender in the second degree (KRS 32 .080(2)). He was acquitted of the homicide charge . He received a life sentence for the arson conviction, and appeals as a matter of right .' On appeal, Yenawine argues that the trial court erred by not giving an instruction on arson in the third degree (KRS 513 .040) ; and that the trial court erred by admitting an incriminating statement obtained by the police in violation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, and in violation of his rights under Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution . We hold that Yenawine should have received an instruction on arson in the third degree, but that his statement to the police was not an unambiguous or unequivocal request for counsel that a reasonable police officer would have understood it as such. Therefore, we reverse and remand to the trial court .

Yenawine v. Com., 2003-SC-000283-MR -Not To Be Published, Affirming in Part Reversing and Remanding in Part-- PDF

Appellant, Samuel Yenawine, was convicted of arson in the first degree (KRS 513.020), four misdemeanor counts of wanton endangerment in the second degree (KRS 508 .070), tampering with physical evidence (KRS 524.100), and of being a persistent felony offender in the second degree (KRS 532.080(2)). He was acquitted of the homicide charge . He received a life sentence for the arson conviction, and appeals as a matter of right.' We hold that the trial court erred in failing to give an instruction on third-degree arson and accordingly, we reverse the first-degree arson conviction . Appellant's convictions of second-degree wanton endangerment, tampering with physical evidence, and of being a persistent felony offender in the second degree are affirmed.