Alea v. Spencer.; 2001-CA-002545-MR; Not Published; Reversed and Remanded. HTML, PDF

Jacta Est Alea filed an action for declaratory judgment after prison officials allegedly lost his false teeth and deprived him of certain constitutional rights.

Thurman Ball, Jr., (hereinafter “Ball”) has appealed from the Rowan Circuit Court’s June 19, 2001, Judgment and Sentence on a plea of guilty, and from the June 29, 2001, order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  Having considered the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable case law, we affirm.

Antonio Barker appeals from an order denying his Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42 motion to vacate a five-year sentence imposed following his conviction of several drug-related offenses.

Ruth Caudill appeals from a judgment of the Pike Circuit Court sentencing her to five years’ imprisonment after a jury convicted her of possession of cocaine and possession of drug paraphernalia.  We affirm.

The present action concerns the trial court’s denial of his “Motion to Obtain Court Records” and his subsequent CR  59.05 motion.  Apparently, Chandler is preparing to file yet another round of motions challenging his conviction.  A convicted felon is not entitled to court records at public expense preparatory to filing a RCr 11.42 motion.   Moreover, the trial court noted that on two occasions Chandler was provided full transcripts and on two other occasions partial transcripts.  We find no error.

George Robert Cline appeals from the judgment of the Daviess Circuit Court denying his second motion for relief under Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42.  Cline claims that he was not afforded a full and fair opportunity to present his claim for relief at his first RCr 11.42 proceeding, as he was not represented by counsel even though he had requested that the court appoint counsel.  The court denied Cline’s motion without a hearing.  We affirm.

Robert A. Cox appeals from a July 20, 2001, order of the Jefferson Circuit Court which revoked his probation.  He contends that his case was improperly transferred to another division of the Jefferson Circuit Court, and that the trial judge who ruled on the motion to revoke lacked the authority to conduct the revocation hearing.  We find that Cox had previously agreed to the transfer of his case to the supervision of the drug court program, and in so doing he waived any objection to the disposition by another circuit judge of a motion to revoke his probation.  Hence, we affirm.

Donnie Dunn (Dunn) appeals from the order of the Montgomery Circuit Court classifying him as a high risk sex offender pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 17.570.

This appeal has been held in abeyance pending resolution by the Kentucky Supreme Court of issues related to the constitutionality of the Kentucky Sex Offender Registration statutes (KRS 17.500 to 17.578).  Having reviewed appellant’s contentions in this case in light of the recent Supreme Court opinion in Hyatt v. Commonwealth, Ky., 72 S.W.3d 566 (2002), we find that case to be dispositive of all issues raised by appellant Erlewein in this appeal.

Craig Frazier brings this appeal from a judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court entered on September 29, 2001.  Frazier was convicted of first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance (cocaine) upon a conditional plea of guilty pursuant to RCr  8.09.  The sole issue for our review is whether the trial court erred in denying Frazier's motion to suppress evidence seized from his person pursuant to an arrest without a warrant.  Frazier maintains that he was arrested inside his apartment by officers who did not have sufficient probable cause to conduct an arrest.  Finding no error, we affirm.

Owen Ray Gadd appeals from an order entered by the Madison Circuit Court designating him as a high risk sex offender pursuant to KRS 17.570.

Houp has appealed to this Court claiming that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to impose new conditions on him some twelve years after he was sentenced on the charges to which he pled guilty, in 1987, and that KRS 17.570 violates the ex post facto provisions of both the state and federal constitutions. The issues raised by Houp have been recently addressed by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Hyatt v. Commonwealth, Ky., 72 S.W.3d 566 (2002).

She contends that the trial court misassessed counsel’s performance.  We affirm.

Appellant Archie Napier was convicted by a jury of the offense of assault in the first degree, and he was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment.  On appeal, he contends that he was denied a fair trial because (1) the court admitted evidence as to prior bad acts, (2) an adequate record was not made of the trial proceedings, and (3) the prosecutor was guilty of prosecutorial misconduct.  We disagree with each of appellant’s contentions.  Hence, we affirm.

Kenneth Noll appeals from an order entered by the Jefferson Circuit Court designating him as a moderate risk sex offender.  This appeal was held in abeyance pending a decision by the Kentucky Supreme Court resolving the issue of the constitutionality of the Sexual Offender Registration Act, KRS 17.500 et seq., commonly known as “Megan’s Law.”

Larry Wayne Palmer appeals from a Daviess Circuit Court order denying his Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42  motion without an evidentiary hearing because it was clear from the face of the record that Palmer was not suffering from any mental defect at the time of trial.

Donald Lee Riley (“Riley”) appeals from a judgment of the Meade Circuit Court wherein he was convicted of failing to register as a sex offender after entering a conditional guilty plea pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure 8.09.  After reviewing the record and applicable law, we affirm.

Patrick J. Russell (Russell) appeals from an order of the Anderson Circuit Court classifying him as a high risk sex offender pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 17.570.  This appeal and others were ordered to be held in abeyance pending the Kentucky Supreme Court’s ruling relative to the constitutionality of KRS 17.570 and related issues.

Searcy has appealed to this Court claiming that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to impose new conditions on him some twenty years after he was sentenced on the charges to which he pled guilty, in 1979, that KRS 175.70 is violative of the separation of powers doctrine set out in Sections 27 and 28 of the Kentucky Constitution, that the classification of Searcy as a moderate risk sexual offender violates numerous provisions of the United States and Kentucky constitution, and that KRS 17.570 violates the ex post facto provisions of both the state and federal constitutions.

Patricia Ann Tia appeals from a Fayette Circuit Court judgment sentencing her to twelve months in jail following a jury verdict finding her guilty of the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. Tia’s first argument on appeal is that she was entitled to a directed verdict as to the theft charge since the Commonwealth failed to produce sufficient evidence to withstand the motion.  Tia’s remaining argument is that the court deprived her of the right to develop her “defense and theory of the case,” namely that she was authorized to borrow the van and that during the period of authorized use, “the van was misappropriated by another.”

On August 20, 1999, Violett filed a RCr  11.42 motion that was denied by the trial court and is now the subject of this appeal.

Cindy Lee Wagner brings this appeal from a September 27, 2001 judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court.  We affirm. Cindy contends the circuit court committed error by improperly striking two jurors for cause.

Leon Wilson appeals from an order denying his post-judgment Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 60.02(e) and (f) motion seeking relief from a final judgment sentencing him to prison following his conviction of second-degree robbery and his plea of guilty to being a second-degree persistent felony offender (PFO).

William Wolford appeals the June 14, 2001, judgment of the Pike Circuit Court ordering him to be involuntarily hospitalized for a period not to exceed 360 days pursuant to a jury verdict.  Wolford challenges that order of commitment.  First, he argues that the underlying probable cause hearing was not conducted within six days as required by KRS  202A.071(1).  He also contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the finding of the jury that he met all the criteria for involuntary hospitalization set forth in KRS 202A.026.